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Nondiscrimination Act
Jessica L. Roberts 63 Vand. L. Rev. 439 (2010)
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act ("GINA'),
enacted in May 2008, protects individuals against discrimination by
insurance companies and employers on the basis of genetic
information. GINA is not only the first civil rights law of the new
millennium, but it is also the first preemptive antidiscrimination
statute in American history. Traditionally, Congress has passed
retrospective antidiscrimination legislation, reacting to existing
discriminatory regimes. However, little evidence indicates that
genetic-information discrimination is currently taking place on a
significant scale. Thus, unlike the laws of the twentieth century,
GINA attempts to eliminate a new brand of discrimination before it
takes hold. This Article provides a detailed look at this
unprecedented new statute, beginning with its initial introduction in
1995. Next, the Article examines the justifications for passing
preemptive genetic-information discrimination legislation,
concluding that Congress had twin objectives: a research
justification and an antidiscrimination justification. Lastly, the
Article explores the implications of passing antidiscrimination
legislation absent a history of discrimination. It concludes that
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INTRODUCTION
In May 2008, Congress passed the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act ("GINA"),1 the first major American
antidiscrimination statute in over a decade. While characterized as
civil rights legislation, GINA represents a major departure from every
antidiscrimination statute preceding it.
Historically, antidiscrimination law has been Janus-like, one
face reflecting upon a legacy of discrimination with the other gazing
forward to stop discrimination in the future. The four major
employment discrimination statutes prior to GINA-Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the
Rehabilitation Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act-were all
retrospective: each looked to discrimination in the past to justify
protection in the present and the future.




Conversely, GINA has little upon which to reflect. GINA
prohibits health insurers and employers from making decisions based
on genetic information. While some examples do exist, both GINA's
advocates and adversaries agreed that scant evidence indicated a
significant history of genetic-information discrimination. Thus,
whereas the preceding laws were retrospective, GINA is preemptive. It
anticipates a form of discrimination that may pose a future threat.
GINA's opponents cited the lack of existing genetic-information
discrimination as evidence that the law was premature or
unnecessary. Its proponents, however, presented GINA as a unique
opportunity to stop discrimination before it starts. It is this
preemptive nature, basing protection on future-rather than past or
even present-discrimination, that truly makes GINA novel.
Novelty aside, preemptive antidiscrimination legislation has its
benefits and its drawbacks. By passing GINA before genetic-
information discrimination could take hold, Congress may have
effectively bypassed a new variety of discriminatory treatment.
GINA's ability to preempt discrimination is perhaps its greatest
strength. Yet the statute's preemptive qualities carry with them
potentially serious hurdles regarding GINA's enforcement and
effectiveness. In particular, its preemptive nature may call into
question Congress's authority to pass antidiscrimination legislation
without an existing history of discrimination. Moreover, if genetic-
information discrimination never becomes a widespread problem, we
will never know whether GINA was wildly successful or totally
unnecessary. Depending upon how these issues are resolved, GINA
may represent the first and last effort at preempting discrimination.
As time passes, it will become clearer whether preemptive legislation
has a role in the future of antidiscrimination law or whether GINA is
merely a fascinating exception to the time-honored tradition of
retrospective lawmaking.
This Article analyzes GINA as the first preemptive
antidiscrimination statute in American history. It proceeds in four
parts. Part I traces the evolution of GINA from its introduction in
1995 to its passage in May 2008. Part II differentiates GINA from the
four retrospective employment discrimination statutes preceding it.
Part III examines the justifications for enacting preemptive genetic
antidiscrimination legislation. Finally, Part IV explores the strengths
and weaknesses of preemptive antidiscrimination legislation.
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I. THE GENETIC INFORMATION NONDISCRIMINATION ACT OF 2008
GINA is the culmination of more than two-dozen proposed bills
and over a decade of legislative debate. This Part begins with the
background of the law, examining what prompted members of
Congress to begin their thirteen-year push for a genetic
antidiscrimination statute. Next, it provides a brief overview of
GINA's lengthy legislative history. It concludes with a close reading of
the statute, highlighting the similarities and differences between the
law's two substantive sections.
A. Background
Congress passed GINA in response to scientific advancements
that advocates feared could result in a new form of discrimination, left
uncovered by existing legal protections.
1. Scientific Background
Genetic-information discrimination is a relatively young
concept, which traces its roots to major scientific developments within
the last two decades. In 1990, scientists began the Human Genome
Project ("HGP"), a thirteen-year effort to sequence the human genome,
coordinated and funded by the U.S. Department of Energy and the
National Institutes of Health. 2 Among its goals were identifying the
protein-coding bases of the human genome; sequencing the over three
billion chemical base pairs that comprise human DNA; inputting this
information into publically available databases; and addressing the
potential ethical, legal, and social issues that might result. 3
Researchers released the results of the HGP in April 2003.4 At
present, over one thousand genetic tests are available.5 Scientists
hoped that studying the human genome would lead to a better
understanding of genetically linked health conditions, including
2. Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Human Genome Project Information, http://www.ornl.
gov/sci/techresources/HumanGenome/home.shtml (last visited Jan. 23, 2009).
3. Id.
4. Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Major Events in the U.S. Human Genome Project and
Related Projects, http://www.ornl.gov/sciltechresources/HumanGenome/project/timeline.shtml
(last visited Jan. 23, 2009).
5. NANCY LEE JONES & AMANDA K. SARATA, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT
FOR CONGRESS, No. RL34584, THE GENETIC INFORMATION NONDISCRIMINATION ACT OF 2008
(GINA) 2 (updated Oct. 8, 2008), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/




diabetes, heart disease, Parkinson's disease, bipolar disorder, and
asthma.6
Supporters of GINA believed that, while these scientific
advancements might alter the way in which we understand and treat
disease, they would also create new ways to discriminate.7 Since the
mid-nineties, proponents of genetic antidiscrimination legislation cited
the HGP to demonstrate that the United States needs legal
protections for genetic information.8 GINA's advocates maintained
that the existing antidiscrimination regime was not equipped to deal
with this novel form of discrimination.
2. Legal Background
Although the idea of genetic-information discrimination is
relatively new, potential victims had limited federal and state
protections-both in health insurance and in employment-prior to
GINA.
With regard to health insurance, the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA") prohibits group health
insurers from using genetic information in determining eligibility or
setting premiums and from treating genetic information as a
preexisting condition.9 While these provisions protect individuals
within the group, HIPAA does not prevent health insurers from using
genetic information in deciding whether to accept the group as a whole
or in setting the group's premium.10 HIPAA, therefore, applies to
discrimination against individual members of the group but does little
to prevent discrimination against the group in its entirety.
Additionally, the law does not prohibit group health insurers from
requesting genetic information or requiring genetic testing."
Moreover, HIPAA does not apply to individual health insurance
6. Id. at 1. At present scientists have discovered links between genetic mutations and over
6,000 disorders, such as cystic fibrosis, sickle cell anemia, Alzheimer's disease, and multiple
cancers. Carolyne Park, Genetics Offers Tool in Combat of Cancer: Field Young, Pays Off in Early
Detection, ARK.-DEMOCRAT GAZETTE, Aug. 24, 2008, at 1.
7. See, e.g., id.
8. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. H14,906 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 1995) (statement of Rep. Slaughter)
(introducing H.R. 2748).
9. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1181-82
(2006), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-41 (2006). Congress enacted the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act in 1996. Title I protects health insurance for workers and their families when
they change or lose jobs by amending Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), the
Public Health Service Act (PHSA), and the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). Title II, the
Administrative Simplification section, establishes national healthcare standards.
10. JONES & SARATA, supra note 5, at 5.
11. Id.
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policies.'2 Perhaps most importantly, HIPAA offers no protection
outside of health insurance, allowing employers-the providers of
health insurance for millions of working Americans' 3-to use genetic
information in their hiring, firing, and promotion decisions.
Federal law also prevented employment discrimination based
on certain genetic conditions pre-GINA. Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act forbids employers from discriminating against a
qualified individual on the basis of a disability in hiring, promotion,
training, and other job-related decisions.14 The Act defines a disability
as "(a) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more major life activities of such individual; (b) a record of such an
impairment; or (c) being regarded as having such an impairment."15
Thus, although Title I never explicitly mentions genetic information, it
may cover a person who experiences an adverse employment action
based on her genetic information (even if she has not manifested an
impairment) if her employer regards her as having a disability.'6
Proponents of GINA feared that the Supreme Court's limited
interpretation of what constituted "disability" at the time would not
adequately protect genetic information.'7 In Sutton v. United Air
12. Id.
13. See id.
14. Americans with Disabilities Act, Title I, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006) ("No covered entity
shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.").
15. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (emphasis added).
16. Several sources support the position that the ADA protects against genetic-information
discrimination in employment. For example, the EEOC initially interpreted the ADA as covering
genetic information. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, 2 COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 902
(1995). Similarly, EEOC Commissioner Paul Miller has noted that Title I "can be interpreted to
prohibit employment discrimination based on genetic information. However, the ADA does not
explicitly address the issue and its protections are limited and uncertain." Genetic Information in
the Workplace: Hearing on S.1332 Before the Sen. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions,
106th Cong. 1 (2000) (statement of Commissioner Paul Steven Miller, Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission) [hereinafter Statement of Paul Steven Miller]. But perhaps most
tellingly, when a potential claimant filed with the EEOC, alleging genetic-information
discrimination, the Commission issued a determination that its investigation supported her
claim pursuant to the ADA. (I discuss this case at greater length in Section II. See infra Section
II(B)(1)(a).) That said, as of the passing of GINA, no reported cases held that the ADA covered
genetic-information discrimination. JONES & SARATA, supra note 5, at 7.
17. See, e.g., Protecting Against Genetic Discrimination: The Limits of Existing Laws:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions, 107th Cong. 2 (2002)
(testimony of Andrew J. Imparato, President and CEO of the American Association of People
with Disabilities):
[Tihe ADA as drafted does provide some protections against genetic
discrimination in employment, but the law has been interpreted by the
Supreme Court and lower federal courts in a manner which weakens its
protections. Whereas the ADA can be and has been used to stop genetic
2010] PREEMPTING DISCRIMINATION 445
Lines, the Supreme Court held that being "regarded as" having a
disability applied only to two specific circumstances: (1) a mistaken
belief that a person has a limiting impairment, or (2) a mistaken belief
that a nonlimiting impairment substantially limits major life
activities.18 Neither situation covered discrimination based on valid
genetic information. If an employer fires someone because of a genetic
proclivity for cancer, that action does not result from the mistaken
belief that the person actually has cancer or the mistaken belief that
the person's genetic information limits her current performance of
major life activities.
On September 25, 2008-four months after signing GINA-
President George W. Bush signed the Americans with Disabilities Act
Amendments Act of 2008.19 The amendments, which went into effect
January 1, 2009, reject the Supreme Court's limited interpretation of
disability and restore the broad protections intended by Congress. 20
Had GINA been debated only a few months longer, the amendments
could have weakened the claim that existing antidiscrimination laws
failed to protect genetic information. Additionally, another federal
statute, Title VII, may extend to genetic information-but only when
that information is linked to a particular protected group.21
The Executive Branch also protected genetic information before
GINA. President Clinton issued an executive order on February 8,
discrimination in some instances, the protections it affords offer little security
to people with genetic markers and health conditions that have not yet
developed into full-blown debilitating conditions.
Imparato is referring to the United States Supreme Court case Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527
U.S. 471 (1999) and its progeny. The Supreme Court held that the ADA applies only to
unmitigated impairments. Id. at 488. Yet more importantly to genetic-information
discrimination, the Court also limited what constituted being "regarded as" having a disability.
See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
18. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489 (restricting being "regarded as" having a disability to two
circumstances: "(1) a covered entity mistakenly believes that a person has a physical impairment
that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or (2) a covered entity mistakenly
believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life
activities"). The Court noted: "In both cases, it is necessary that a covered entity entertain
misperceptions about the individual-it must believe either that one has a substantially limiting
impairment that one does not have or that one has a substantially limiting impairment when, in
fact, the impairment is not so limiting." Id.
19. Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553
(2008).
20. Id. § 2(a)(4) (finding that "the holdings of the Supreme Court in Sutton v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) and its companion cases have narrowed the broad scope of
protection intended to be afforded by the ADA, thus eliminating protection for many individuals
whom Congress intended to protect").
21. See, e.g., Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 1998)
(holding that blood tests for sickle cell violated Title VII). Norman-Bloodsaw is, however, the
only case of this kind.
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2000 forbidding genetic-information discrimination against federal
employees. 22 The Executive Order on Genetic Discrimination prohibits
federal departments and agencies from firing, failing to hire, limiting,
segregating, classifying, or otherwise discriminating against their
employees and potential employees on the basis of "protected genetic
information."23 It also proscribes departments and agencies from
acquiring or disclosing "protected genetic information," except under
special circumstances. 2 4 The Order defines "protected genetic
information" as "(A) information about an individual's genetic tests;
(B) information about the genetic tests of an individual's family
members; or (C) information about the occurrence of a disease, or
medical condition or disorder in family members of the individual."25
Congress would adopt a very similar definition when passing GINA
over eight years later.26
In addition to the federal measures, several pre-GINA state
statutes protected against genetic-information discrimination in both
health insurance 27 and employment. 28 Yet the state laws are limited in
scope, as ERISA's preemption provision exempts self-funded,
employer-provided private health insurance from state insurance
laws. 2 9 Over half of covered Americans are insured through these
22. Exec. Order No. 13,145, 65 Fed. Reg. 6,877 (Feb. 8, 2000).
23. Id. §§ 1-202(a), (b).
24. Id. §§ 1-202(c), (d).
25. Id. § 1-201(e)(1).
26. See infra note 83.
27. As of January 2008, forty-eight states and the District of Columbia have enacted laws
prohibiting certain uses of genetic information by health insurers. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, GENETICS AND HEALTH INSURANCE STATE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAwS (2008),
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/ndishlth.htm. Mississippi and Pennsylvania lack
statutes on this issue. Alabama prohibits denying coverage to people with the sickle cell trait and
considering a predisposition for cancer in risk assessment but allows other considerations of
genetic information. Id. Washington's statute only prevents the disclosure of genetic information
without consent, thereby allowing the use of genetic information in eligibility determinations. Id.
Most of the laws apply to both group and individual insurance policies, while some states cover
only one or the other. Id. Many, but not all, prohibit insurers from requiring genetic testing or
genetic information. Id.
28. States first began protecting against genetic-information discrimination in the 1970s
and 80s by outlawing discrimination based on the sickle cell trait. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, STATE GENETICS EMPLOYMENT LAWS (2008), http://www.ncsl.org/programs/
health/genetics/ndiscrim.htm. In 1991, Wisconsin became the first state to prohibit genetic
testing and discrimination at work. Id. As of January 2008, thirty-four states and the District of
Columbia outlawed employment discrimination based on genetic information. Id. However, the
range of the law varies. All the laws cover discrimination based on the results of genetic tests,
and several include inherited characteristics, but may not include family members' genetic test
results or family history. Id. Some states include safety exceptions, allowing employers to use
genetic information when identifying potential workplace hazards. Id.
29. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2006).
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types of plans, 30 making preemption a serious obstacle to enforcing
state statutes that prohibit genetic-information discrimination in
health insurance.
Yet despite the protections for genetic information that existed
at the time, GINA's advocates argued that those safeguards were
ultimately inadequate, urging Congress to pass a comprehensive
federal statute.
B. Legislative History
Before passing almost unanimously, GINA endured a thirteen-
year odyssey through Congress. In 1994, members of the 103rd
Congress first considered the issue of genetic-information
discrimination as part of national healthcare reform.31 The next term,
several members introduced bills specifically prohibiting
discrimination based on genetic information. 32 Among the six bills
introduced between 1995 and 1996, the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of 1995, sponsored by
Representative Louise Slaughter, won the most support with seventy-
six cosponsors.33 However, the companion bill in the Senate, sponsored
by Senator Olympia Snowe, had only one cosponsor.34 Although
Slaughter's bill died at the end of the 104th Congress, its supporters
remained tenacious: both Representative Slaughter-a microbiologist
with a Masters in Public Health35-and Senator Snowe would fight for
genetic antidiscrimination legislation in each subsequent Congress
until GINA passed.
30. Wendy K. Mariner, Can Consumer-Choice Plans Satisfy Patients? Problems with Theory
and Practice in Health Insurance Contracts, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 485, 489 (2004).
31. S. Rep. No. 108-122, at 13 (2003).
32. The genetic antidiscrimination bills introduced in the 104th Congress were: the Genetic
Confidentiality and Nondiscrimination Act of 1996, S. 1898, 104th Cong. (1996) (sponsored by
Sen. Pete Domenici); the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of
1995, S. 1694, 104th Cong. (1996) (companion bill to H.R. 2748) (sponsored by Sen. Olympia
Snowe); the Genetic Fairness Act of 1996, S. 1600, 104th Cong. (1996) (sponsored by Sen. Dianne
Feinstein); the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of 1995, H.R.
2748, 104th Cong. (1995) (sponsored by Rep. Louise Slaughter); the Genetic Privacy and
Nondiscrimination Act of 1995, S. 1416, 104th Cong. (1995) (sponsored by Sen. Mark Hatfield);
and the Genetic Privacy and Nondiscrimination Act of 1995, H.R. 2690, 104th Cong. (1995)
(companion bill to S. 1416) (sponsored by Rep. Clifford Stearns).
33. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of 1995, H.R. 2748,
104th Cong. (1995) (list of cosponsors, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery
/z?dl04:HRO2748:@@P).
34. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of 1995, S. 1694, 104th
Cong. (1996) (list of cosponsors, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery
/z?d104:SN01694:@@@P).
35. Jonathan D. Rockoff, Senate Protects Genetic Test Data, BALT. SUN, Apr. 25, 2008, at lA.
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In the following years, members of the House and Senate
introduced multiple bills prohibiting genetic-information
discrimination each term: seven bills in the 105th Congress, 36 three in
the 106th,37 four in the 107th,38 five in the 108th,39 two in the 109th,40
and two in the 110th.4 1 Yet despite hundreds of cosponsors, 42 term
after term, opponents managed to stop the bills in the House. 43 The
36. The bills of the 105th Congress were: the Genetic Protection in Insurance Coverage Act,
H.R. 2216, 105th Cong. (1997) (sponsored by Rep. Joseph P. Kennedy); the Genetic Privacy and
Nondiscrimination Act of 1997, H.R. 2198, 105th Cong. (1997) (sponsored by Rep. Clifford
Stearns); the Genetic Confidentiality and Nondiscrimination Act of 1997, S. 422, 105th Cong.
(1997) (sponsored by Sen. Pete Domenici); the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in Health
Insurance Act Of 1997, S. 89, 105th Cong. (1997) (companion bill to H.R. 306) (sponsored by Sen.
Olympia Snowe); the Genetic Information Health Insurance Discrimination Act of 1997, H.R.
328, 105th Cong. (1997) (sponsored by Rep. Gerald Solomon); the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of 1997, H.R. 306, 105th Cong. (1997) (sponsored by
Rep. Louise Slaughter); and the Genetic Privacy and Nondiscrimination Act of 1997, H.R. 341,
105th Cong. (1997) (sponsored by Rep. Clifford Stearns).
37. The 106th Congress had three bills introduced: H.R. Res. 520, 106th Congress (2000)
(sponsored by Rep. Louise Slaughter) ("Providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 2457) to
prohibit health insurance and employment discrimination against individuals and their family
members on the basis of predictive genetic information or genetic services."); the Genetic
Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance and Employment Act of 1999, H.R. 2457, 106th Cong.
(1999) (sponsored by Rep. Louise Slaughter); the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in
Health Insurance Act of 1999, S. 543, 106th Cong. (1999) (sponsored by Sen. Olympia Snowe).
38. The four bills of the 107th Congress were: the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination
in Health Insurance Act of 2001, S. 382, 107th Cong. (2001) (sponsored by Sen. Olympia Snowe);
the Genetic Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance and Employment Act, H.R. 602, 107th Cong.
(2001) (sponsored by Rep. Louise Slaughter); the Genetic Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance
and Employment Act, S. 318, 107th Cong. (2001) (sponsored Sen. Thomas Daschle); and the
Protecting Civil Rights for All Americans Act, S. 19, 107th Cong. Title IV (2001) (sponsored by
Sen. Thomas Daschle) ("Providing for genetic nondiscrimination in health insurance and
employment").
39. In the 108th Congress, there were five bills proposed: the Bipartisan Patient Protection
Act of 2004, S. 2083, 108th Cong. (2004) (sponsored by Rep. Barbara Boxer); the Genetic Privacy
and Nondiscrimination Act of 2003, H.R. 3636, 108th Cong. (2003) (sponsored by Rep. Clifford
Stearns); the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2003, S. 1053, 108th Cong. (2003)
(sponsored by Sen. Olympia Snowe); H.R. 1910, 108th Cong. (2003) (sponsored by Rep. Louise
Slaughter); the Equal Rights and Equal Dignity for Americans Act of 2003, S. 16, 108th Cong.
(2003) (sponsored by Sen. Thomas Daschle).
40. The 109th Congress only proposed two bills: the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination
Act of 2005, H.R. 1227, 109th Cong. (2005) (sponsored by Rep. Judy Biggert) and the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2005, S. 306, 109th Cong. (2005) (sponsored by Sen.
Olympia Snowe).
41. Representative Slaughter introduced the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of
2008, H.R. 493, 110th Cong. (2007), which would eventually become GINA, and Senator Snowe
introduced the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2007, S. 358, 110th Cong. (2007).
42. For example, Representative Slaughters' bills H.R. 1910 and H.R. 306 had 242 and 213
cosponsors, respectively. H.R. 1910, 108th Cong. (2003); the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of 1997, H.R. 306, 105th Cong. (1997).
43. Jerry Zremski, Bush Signs Genetic Bias Bill into Law, BUFFALO NEWS, May 22, 2008, at
Al (quoting Sharon Terry, President of the Genetic Alliance).
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strongest opposition came from the business community, which feared
that the proposed laws would increase litigation as well as bar
insurers from recommending potentially life-saving genetic tests. 44
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in Employment Coalition
("GINE Coalition"), a business group that included the Society for
Human Resource Management, the Chamber of Commerce, and the
National Association of Manufacturers, was among the most powerful
groups contesting legislation. 45 Despite bipartisan support,46 genetic
antidiscrimination advocates believed that the Republican leadership
in the House was responsible for failing to push the bills to the floor.47
When the Democrats won control in the 2006 interim election,
supporters of the legislation hoped the switch in party control would
finally bring the legislation to a vote.
On January 16, 2007, with over a hundred cosponsors,
Representative Slaughter introduced the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act of 2007.48 A few months later, the bill passed
44. Judith Graham, Senate: DNA Bias Not Legal; House Expected to Pass Ban on Use of
Genetic Profiles Against Workers, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 25, 2008, at C1 ("Opposition to the legislation
came largely from the business community, which was concerned about potential law suits and
financial liability for technical errors, among other issues."); Why It Matters, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, Sept. 30, 2007 ("[According to its opponents,] the measure could cause businesses big
problems. Among other things, employers fear it would subject them to numerous lawsuits and
insurers say they could be barred from recommending genetic tests that could enable people to
get life-saving treatments.").
45. Protecting Workers from Genetic Discrimination: Hearing Before H. Subcomm. on
Health, Employment, Labor and Pensions of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 110th
Cong. 110-1 (2007) (statement of Burton J. Fishman, Counsel to GINE Coalition) [hereinafter
Statement of Burton J. Fishman].
46. Since the beginning of his presidency, President George W. Bush spoke out against
genetic discrimination:
Genetic discrimination is unfair to workers and their families. It is
unjustified. To deny employment or insurance to a healthy person based only
on a predisposition violates our country's belief in equal treatment and
individual merit. In the past, other forms of discrimination have been used to
withhold rights and opportunities that belong to all Americans. Just as we
have addressed discrimination based on race, gender and age, we must now
prevent discrimination based on genetic information.
Genetic Information in the Workplace: Hearing on S.1332 Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ.,
Labor, and Pensions, 106th Cong. (2001) (testimony of Dr. Francis S. Collins, Director of
National Human Genome Research Institute) (quoting President George W. Bush), available at
http://www.genome.gov/10003482. Moreover, members of both parties often cosponsored or voted
for the genetic-information discrimination bills.
47. See Zremski, supra note 43.
48. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2007, H.R. 493, 110th Cong. (2007)
(listing cosponsors), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl 10:HR00493:@@P.
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the House with a vote of 420-3.49 However, Senator Tom Coburn, a
medical doctor from Oklahoma-nicknamed "Dr. No" for his holds on
numerous bills up for unanimous consent 50-put a hold on
Representative Slaughter's bill.5 ' Senator Coburn was concerned that
the bill could subject employers to employment discrimination suits
because of disputes over health insurance coverage. 52 According to this
scenario, someone who has a genetic-information discrimination claim
for health insurance might assert that the same conduct underlying
the health insurance claim also qualifies as employment
discrimination. Senator Coburn feared that employers who provide
their own health insurance could be sued twice under GINA,53
" 'creat[ing] a trial lawyer's bonanza.' "54 It therefore appeared that yet
another genetic antidiscrimination bill might be stymied.
Eventually, a Democratic staffer from the House Energy and
Commerce Committee proposed a solution: creating a "firewall"
between the health insurance and employment parts of the bill to
ensure that claimants could not sue under both provisions
simultaneously to reap the benefits of the sections' separate
remedies.55 The firewall prohibits employment discrimination claims
for conduct that is actionable under GINA's health insurance
provisions. 56 After the Senate amended the bill to include the firewall,
Senator Coburn let it go forward.57
Almost exactly a year after the House's vote, the Senate passed
the amended bill 95-0 on April 24, 2008.58 The House then approved it
49. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2007, H.R. 493, 110th Cong.,
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl10:HR00493:@@@R (providing chronology
of major actions).
50. Zremski, supra note 43.
51. Chris Casteel, When Your Genes Are the Enemy, OKLAHOMAN, Aug. 18, 2007, at 1A.




55. Zremski, supra note 43.
56. The firewall prevents the employment discrimination title of GINA from "provid[ing] for
enforcement of, or penalties for, a violation of any requirement or prohibition applicable to any
covered entity subject to enforcement for a violation under [the health insurance portion of the]
Act." Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. Law No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 §
209(b) (2008).
57. Amy Harmon, Congress Passes Bill to Bar Bias Based on Genes, N.Y. TIMES, May 2,
2008, at Al.
58. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2007, H.R. 493, 110th Cong., available at




414-1 with Congressman Ron Paul as the lone dissenter.59 On May 21,
2008, President George W. Bush signed GINA into law.6 0 Thus, after
thirteen years of false starts and near misses, Congress finally passed
a genetic antidiscrimination statute. 61
C. Provisions
Having traced GINA's journey through Congress, I now turn to
the text of the statute itself, examining how GINA's provisions relate
to existing laws and to each other.
1. Provisions of Titles I, II, and III
GINA includes three titles: Title I prohibits genetic-information
discrimination in health insurance, Title II prohibits genetic-
information discrimination in employment, and Title III contains
miscellaneous provisions regarding severability and child labor. Each
of the two substantive titles draws from existing statutes, making
GINA both new and familiar.
a. Title I
Title I bars health insurers from using genetic information to
determine coverage, eligibility, or premiums; from requesting or
requiring genetic testing or genetic information; and from obtaining
genetic information for underwriting purposes. 62 Additionally,
individual insurers and issuers of supplemental Medicare coverage
59. In explaining his failure to support the H.R. 493, Rep. Paul cited his support for
federalism and individualized decision-making in healthcare. See 155 CONG. REC. 4100 (daily ed.
Apr. 25, 2007) (statement of Rep. Paul).
60. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2007, H.R. 493, 110th Cong. (chronology
of major actions), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl 10:HR00493:@@@R.s).
61. See Mark A. Rothstein, Is GINA Worth the Wait?, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 174, 174
(2008):
[GINA] has been pending in Congress for twelve years, despite the support of
the last two presidential Administrations and the National Institutes of
Health. It has been the subject of extensive affirmative lobbying by academic
medical centers, pharmaceutical and biotech companies, genetic disease
advocacy groups, and civil rights organizations. It has overcome vehement
objections by employers and insurers. Its final passage, however, has been
thwarted by a few Congressional leaders, who have prevented enactment
despite overwhelming bipartisan support in both houses of Congress.




cannot treat genetic information as a preexisting condition.63 As with
HIPAA, in lieu of drafting a new statute, Congress amended existing
health insurance laws to provide unified protection against genetic-
information discrimination.
Title I reflects the complicated nature of the American health
insurance system. It fortifies and clarifies HIPAA's protections by
amending the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA"), 64 the Public Health Services Act ("PHSA"), 65 and the
Internal Revenue Code. 66 Title I also contains sections amending the
Social Security Act ("SSA"). 67 GINA, therefore, applies to the group
plans covered by ERISA, the group and individual plans governed by
the PHSA, churches under the Internal Revenue Code, and Medigap
pursuant to the SSA.
b. Title II
Title II prohibits employers from hiring, firing, classifying, or
otherwise disadvantaging employees on the basis of genetic
information, as well as from requesting, requiring, or purchasing
genetic information. 68 Additionally, Title II prohibits discrimination by
unions, employment agencies, and training programs.69
Like Title I, Title II draws from existing laws. For example, it
defines "employee" and "employer" according to Title VII,70 "state
employee" and "state employer" according to the Government
Employee Rights Act,71 and "covered employee" and "employing office"
according to the Congressional Accountability Act. 7 2 As with Title VII,
claimants under Title II of GINA must file with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") before suing.73
63. Id. § 102(b). As mentioned, HIPAA prohibits group insurers from treating genetic
information as a preexisting condition. Supra note 9.
64. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act § 101.
65. Id. § 102.
66. Id. § 103.
67. Id. § 104.
68. Id. § 202.
69. Id. §§ 203-05.
70. Id. § 202(2)(A)(i), (2)(B)(i).
71. Id. § 202(2)(A)(ii).
72. Id. § 202(2)(A)(iii).
73. Under both Title VII and GINA, before suing, a victim of discrimination must first file a
"Charge of Discrimination" with the EEOC. EEOC, Filing a Charge of Discrimination,
http://www.eeoc.gov/employees/charge.cfm (last visited Mar. 2, 2010). If the EEOC chooses not to
pursue the claim, it will issue the claimant a "Notice of Right to Sue," authorizing her to sue her
employer. Id. Title VII and GINA claimants can also request the right to sue 180 days after first
filing with the EEOC. EEOC, Filing a Lawsuit, http://www.eeoc.gov/employees/lawsuit.cfm (last
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However, unlike Title VII, claimants cannot file disparate impact
actions.74 GINA, therefore, prohibits only explicit discrimination on
the basis of genetic information.
Importantly, Title II also defines the limits of GINA's
protections. For example, it includes the aforementioned "firewall
provision," which provides that a claimant cannot simultaneously sue
her employer and health insurer for health insurance violations
(unless the employer independently violated Title ID).75 However, Title
II does not preclude claims under other federal or state statutes
offering equal or greater protection-including the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.76
c. Title III
Lastly, Title III contains miscellaneous provisions. A
severability provision specifies that if any part of GINA is held
unconstitutional, the remainder of the Act will remain in effect.77 Title
III also amends the Fair Labor Standards Act by increasing the
penalties for violating child labor laws and defining the term "serious
injury."7 8 Because Title III does not contain substantive provisions
dealing with genetic-information discrimination, this Article focuses
on Titles I and II.
visited Mar. 2, 2010). If a claimant files a claim with a local or state Fair Employment Practice
Agency ("FEPA") and federal antidiscrimination laws also apply, the FEPA will "dual-file" the
claim with the EEOC; thus, the claimant does not need to file independently with both agencies.
http://www.eeoc.gov/employees/charge.cfm. Federal employees have similar protections but must
follow a different claims process. See EEOC, Overview of Federal Sector EEO Complaint Process,
http://www.eeoc.gov/federal/fed-employees/complaintoverview.cfm (last visited Mar. 2, 2010).
74. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act § 207. Congress plans to revisit this
issue six years after the law's enactment. Id. § 208.
75. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text. Despite the firewall, there is some
overlap. See EEOC Title II Proposed Rules, 79 Fed. Reg. 9056, 9065 (Mar. 2, 2009) (to be codified
at 19 C.F.R. pt. 1635) (noting "the firewall does not immunize covered entities from liability for
decisions and actions taken that violate Title II, including employment decisions based on health
benefits, because such benefits are within the definition of compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment").
76. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act § 209. GINA, therefore, creates a "floor" for
the protection of genetic information without preempting state laws that offer more substantial
protections. Section 209 also includes other rules of construction, including that GINA does not
apply to the Armed Forces Repository of Specimen Samples for the Identification of Remains. Id.
77. Id. § 301.
78. Id. § 302.
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2. Comparison of Titles I and II
GINA's substantive titles contain both notable similarities and
relevant differences regarding the way in which they protect genetic
information.
a. Definitions
Both substantive titles contain similar-yet not identical-
definitions of "genetic information" and "genetic test." These
definitions complement one another while accounting for different
issues specific to either employment or health insurance.
i. Genetic Information
Both Title I and Title II define a person's "genetic information"
as "(i) such individual's genetic tests, (ii) the genetic tests of family
members of such individual, and (iii) the manifestation of a disease or
disorder in family members of such individual."79 Both definitions
exclude any information related to sex or age80 but include the genetic
information of embryos and fetuses.81
While the definitions of genetic information in the two titles
are similar, Title II contains an additional provision that
differentiates between genetic-information discrimination and
discrimination on the basis of a manifested genetic condition. This
provision, Section 210, clarifies that with regard to Title II, "the use,
acquisition, or disclosure of medical information that is not genetic
information about a manifested disease, disorder, or pathological
condition, even if such has or may have a genetic basis" cannot
constitute the basis of a GINA employment discrimination claim.82 Put
79. Id. §§ 101(a)(2), 102(a)(2), 103(a)(2), 104(b), 201(4)(A)(i)-(iii). This definition appears to
borrow heavily from an executive order issued by President Clinton, barring genetic-information
discrimination against federal employees. Supra note 22.
80. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act §§ 101(a)(2), 102(a)(2), 103(a)(2), 104(b),
201(4)(C). Underwriting traditionally uses age, sex, and occupation, among other factors, to
determine premiums.
81. The inclusion of fetal and embryonic genetic information was another area of
compromise for GINA's supporters. See Protecting Workers from Genetic Discrimination: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. of Health, Employment, Labor and Pensions of the H. Comm. of Educ. and
Labor, 110th Cong. 25-26 (2007) (statement of Rep. Pete Hoekstra) (stating he was "very
concerned" that GINA "[did] not protect an enibryo, fetus or a child in the process of adoption
from genetic discrimination").
82. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act § 210.
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differently, once genetic information manifests into an impairing
condition, GINA no longer applies.83
ii. Genetic Test
Unlike Title II, Title I does not contain a provision like Section
210 that explicitly states medical information about manifested
conditions is not "genetic information." However, Title I's definition of
"genetic test" limits its application to manifested disorders. 84 Both
titles provide that "an analysis of human DNA, RNA, chromosomes,
proteins, or metabolites that detects genotypes, mutations, or
chromosomal changes" constitutes a genetic test.8 5 Title I also exempts
the following from its definition:
[An] analysis of proteins or metabolites that does not detect genotypes, mutations, or
chromosomal changes, or an analysis of proteins or metabolites that is directly related
to a manifested disease, disorder, or pathological condition that could reasonably be
detected by a health care professional with appropriate training and expertise in the
field of medicine involved.
8 6
83. Although the ADA protects employees against discrimination on the basis of disability-
including those with genetic components-whether the discrimination is on the basis of genetic
information or a manifested medical condition may not always be clear, thereby rendering the
relationship between GINA and the ADA both ambiguous and complex. For example, an
employer might fire a woman who suffers from cancer and who has a mutation on her BRCA1
gene. If the employer fires her merely on the basis of her mutated gene (genetic information)-
perhaps without knowledge that she has developed cancer-GINA applies. Conversely, if the
employer fires her specifically because of her cancer (manifested medical condition)-perhaps
without knowledge of her genetic predisposition to cancer-the ADA applies. Things, of course,
become far more complicated when employers are aware of both an employee's genetic
information and manifested medical conditions. In fact, anecdotes related to genetic-information
discrimination blur this line. See, e.g., supra Part II.B.1.b; see also Jessica L. Roberts,
Antisubordination and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (2010) (on file with
author) (providing detailed description of GINA's failure to cover manifested genetic conditions).
84. Once genetic information manifests into a related health condition, GINA no longer
applies. At present, health insurers may limit benefits or increase premiums for people with
manifested genetic disorders. See Roberts, supra note 83, at Part II. However, recently proposed
health care reforms may bar health insurers from considering health status of any kind. See
America's Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009, H.R. 3200 (2009); Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act of 2009, H.R. 3590 (2009).
85. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act §§ 101(a)(2), 102(a)(2), 103(a)(2), 104(b),
201(7).
86. Id. § 101(d); 29 U.S.C. § 1191b-(d)(7)(B) (2006). In its proposed rules for interpreting
Title II, the EEOC notes that:
Title II does not require this language of exclusion because Congress
determined that these uses "are not applicable in the employment context."
However, . . . the Commission borrowed from Title I's use of the term
"manifest" in the definition of "genetic test" in formulating a definition of
"manifested or manifestation."
Regulations Under the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 74 Fed. Reg. 9056,
9059 (Mar. 2, 2009) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1365) (citing S. Rep. No. 110-48, at 28). Thus,
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Thus, a test that detects a manifested medical condition is not a
"genetic test" under Title I.
b. Exceptions
In drafting GINA, Congress included important exceptions
intended both to benefit and protect health insurers and employers.
For example, Title I includes a research exception that allows group
health plans to request-but not require-a person to undergo genetic
testing for research purposes, but only under certain conditions.87
Title I also does not penalize insurers for incidentally acquiring
genetic information.88
Similarly, Title II does not apply to the incidental acquisition of
genetic information. 89 For instance, Congress sought to avoid the
"water cooler problem."90 The "water cooler problem" occurs if an
employer inadvertently obtains genetic information through casual
conversation, such as when an employee mentions that her mother
died of breast cancer. 91 Additionally, Title II does not cover
information unwittingly acquired by purchasing commercially
available documents that contain an employee's family medical
history, such as an obituary in a newspaper.92
Title II also includes exceptions for intentionally obtaining
genetic information. An employer can lawfully acquire genetic
information when offering certain genetic services such as employee
while Title I and Title II exclude manifested medical conditions from GINA's protection in
different ways-Title I through its definition of "genetic test" and Title II through its definition of
"genetic information"-the EEOC defines "manifest" with regard to its Title II proposed
regulation in such a way that the term will remain consistent across both substantive Titles.
87. To request genetic testing under the research exception, a plan must ensure that
compliance is voluntary and noncompliance has no effect on the insured's status, none of the
information will be used for underwriting purposes, and the Secretary of Health and Human
Services is aware that research is being done. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act §§
101(b), 102(a), 103(b), 104(b).
88. Id. §§ 101(b), 102(a), 103(b), 104(b).
89. Id. §§ 202(b), 203(b), 204(b), 205(b).
90. See S. Rep. No. 110-48, at 28 (2007).
91. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act §§ 202(b)(1), 203(b)(1), 204(b)(1), 205(b)(1).
In its proposed rules, the EEOC extends this exception beyond the protection of family history to
all inadvertently obtained genetic information. Regulations Under the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 79 Fed. Reg. 9056, 9061 (Mar. 2, 2009) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R.
pt. 1635) ("Although the language of this exception in GINA specifically refers to family medical
history, the Commission believes that it is consistent with Congress's intent to extend the
exception to any genetic information that an employer inadvertently acquires.").
92. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act §§ 202(b)(4), 203(b)(4), 204(b)(4), 205(b)(4).
PREEMPTING DISCRIMINATION
wellness programs, 93  when complying with the certification
requirements of state and federal medical leave laws, 94 and when
monitoring the effects of toxic substances on employees. 95 Another
exemption relates to law enforcement forensic laboratories and applies
only to employers and training programs.96 Thus, Congress recognized
the potentially beneficial aspects of acquiring genetic information and
tailored both Title I and Title II to allow the limited acquisition and
use of genetic information by health insurers and employers.
GINA is a carefully crafted law. Congress designed Title I and
Title II to work in concert with one another and with the existing laws
governing health insurance and employment discrimination. The next
Part takes this analysis a step back by examining how the very nature
of genetic-information discrimination differs from the discriminatory
regimes targeted by previous statutes.
II. RETROSPECTIVE VS. PREEMPTIVE ANTIDISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION
Traditionally, American antidiscrimination statutes have
reacted to existing discrimination, looking to histories of exclusion or
unequal treatment to justify their protections. GINA-while citing
some examples of genetic-information discrimination-is far more
oriented toward shaping the future than reflecting on the past. GINA
is, therefore, perhaps the first American antidiscrimination statute
specifically geared toward preempting a form of future discrimination
before it becomes entrenched.
A. Retrospective Antidiscrimination Legislation
Pre-GINA, four statutes prevented employers from
discriminating against their workers: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 ("Title VII"), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA"), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and Title I of the Americans
93. Id. §§ 202(b)(2), 203(b)(2), 204(b)(2), 205(b)(2). To qualify for that exemption, the
individual must give prior, knowing, voluntary, written authorization, only the individual and
the authorized service provider must receive identifiable information pertaining to the results,
and that information must not be provided to the employer, unless it is in unidentifiable,
aggregate form.
94. Id. §§ 202(b)(3), 203(b)(3), 204(b)(3), 205(b)(3).
95. Id. §§ 202(b)(5), 203(b)(5), 204(b)(5), 205(b)(5). That exception requires the requesting
entity to give written notice of the genetic monitoring, to receive prior, known, voluntary, written
authorization from the employee to be monitored, to inform the monitored employee of the
results, to comply with the relevant state and federal monitoring regulations, and only to receive
the results in aggregate terms.
96. Id. §§ 202, 205.
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with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). 97 Each of these laws addressed an
existing discriminatory regime.
1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
On July 2, 1964, President Lyndon Johnson signed the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. This landmark piece of legislation outlawed
unequal treatment in education, public facilities, government, and
employment.98 Title VII of the Act prohibits employers from
discriminating on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, or
sex.99 Although the Court eventually interpreted the law to cover
categories that had not traditionally experienced discrimination, such
as men and whites,100 Congress first passed Title VII primarily in
reaction to existing discrimination against black Americans. When
signing the law, President Johnson explained that "millions are being
deprived of [the] blessings [of liberty]-not because of their own
failures, but because of the color of their skin.. . . But it cannot
continue."101 Even absent explicit congressional findings, 102 the
97. Because GINA deals specifically with the workplace, this Section focuses on
employment discrimination laws. Other types of antidiscrimination legislation, like Section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), justify protection based on existing discrimination. 42
U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006):
[A violation of the VRA has occurred] if, based on the totality of
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination
or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to
participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in
that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate
to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice.
98. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-d, 2000 (2006).
99. Section 703(a) of Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensations, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities, or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
100. See, e.g., Yeary v. Goodwill Indus.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1997)
(holding that "Title VII . . . applies equally to men and women"); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 (1976) (holding that Title VII applies equally "to members of all
races").
101. WHALEN & B. WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 227-28 (1985). Thus, although the statute includes other groups, advocates
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Supreme Court has continually interpreted Title VII as reacting to
past discrimination against all the named categories. 103 Thus, Title
intended Title VII to integrate Black Americans economically by improving their access to
employment opportunities. See Sandi Farrell, Toward Getting Beyond the Blame Game: A
Critique of the Ideology of Voluntarism in Title VII Jurisprudence, 92 KY. L.J. 483, 490 (2003-
2004) ("It seems beyond dispute that job segregation on the basis of race and sex was the
principal phenomenon that Title VII was intended to ameliorate."); see also SAMUEL ESTREICHER
& MICHAEL C. HARPER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION & EMPLOYMENT LAW 53 (3d ed. 2008)
("Passed over considerable opposition by representatives from the Southern states, Title VII
extended antidiscrimination commands to private employment, and sought to promote the
economic integration of blacks into mainstream American society.").
102. Unlike with other antidiscrimination statutes, Congress provided no official findings
when enacting the Civil Rights Act. However, the Act has an extensive legislative history. See
ESTREICHER & HARPER, supra note 101, at 227-28 (providing an overview of the Act's legislative
history).
103. The Court described Title VII as "a complex legislative design directed at a historic evil
of national proportions" in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody. 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975). Similarly, in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Court again indicated that Congress intended Title VII to remedy
existing discrimination: "[t]he objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from
the language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove
barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over
other employees." 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971). The Court expressed a similar sentiment a year
later in its opinion in United Steelworkers v. Weber, stating that "Congress' primary concern in
enacting the prohibition against racial discrimination in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
was with 'the plight of the Negro in our economy.'" 443 U.S. 193, 202 (1972) (quoting 110 Cong.
Rec. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)). The Court went on to explain:
Before 1964, blacks were largely relegated to "unskilled and semi-skilled
jobs." Because of automation the number of such jobs was rapidly decreasing.
As a consequence, "the relative position of the Negro worker [was] steadily
worsening. In 1947 the nonwhite unemployment rate was only 64 percent
higher than the white rate; in 1962 it was 124 percent higher." Congress
considered this a serious social problem. As Senator Clark told the Senate:
"The rate of Negro unemployment has gone up consistently as compared with
white unemployment for the past 15 years. This is a social malaise and a
social situation which we should not tolerate. That is one of the principal
reasons why the bill should pass."
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Because Title VII's legislative history focuses primarily on race (and color), there is very little
discussion of the other categories. See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF TITLES VII & XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 3-11 (1968). However, the Supreme
Court had already treated national origin discrimination with the same level of equal protection
scrutiny as race, see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216-17 (1944) (treating the
exclusion of Japanese Americans as racial exclusion), indicating that discrimination on the basis
of national origin was already occurring. Similarly, the First Amendment protected religious
groups against discrimination. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S.
1, 8-15 (1947) (reviewing the history of religious discrimination in the United States to provide
background for the First Amendment's protection of religion). The Supreme Court noted:
[t]he meaning and scope of the First Amendment, preventing establishment
of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, in the light of its history
and the evils it was designed forever to suppress, have been several times
elaborated by the decisions of this Court prior to the application of the First
Amendment to the states by the Fourteenth.
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VII is a retrospective statute, looking to past discrimination to justify
protection in the present and in the future.
2. Age Discrimination in Employment Act
The ADEA, which Congress passed in 1967,104 is also
backward-gazing. The law prohibits employment discrimination
against individuals forty years of age and over.105 Much like GINA, it
is a hybrid: it combines substantive law drawn from Title VII with
remedies from the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.106 In passing the
ADEA, Congress explicitly referenced older workers' inability to retain
or regain employment and the resulting unemployment of older
Americans. 107 Thus, as with Title VII, Congress sought to protect a
particular group-people over forty-based on discrimination that
group members had faced in the past.108
Everson, 330 U.S. at 14-15. Although sex discrimination was not yet recognized as
constitutionally prohibited in 1964, following the 1972 amendments, courts interpreted Title VII
as an effort to remedy discrimination against women, who had suffered tangible disadvantage in
the workplace by virtue of their sex. Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 664 (9th
Cir. 1977) ("[T]he clear intent of the 1972 legislation was to remedy the economic deprivation of
women as a class. The cases interpreting Title VII sex discrimination provisions agree that they
were intended to place women on an equal footing with men.").
104. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 [hereinafter
ADEA]; see also ESTREICHER & HARPER, supra note 101, at 428 (noting that while Congress
failed to enact age discrimination statute in 1964 it remedied this failure in 1967 with the
enactment of ADEA).
105. In General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581 (2004), plaintiffs argued
that in addition to prohibiting discrimination against the old in favor of the young, the ADEA
prohibits discriminatory preferences against the young in favor of the old. The Supreme Court
held that it does not.
106. ESTREICHER & HARPER, supra note 101, at 428; see also JOEL WM. FRIEDMAN, THE LAW
OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 810 (6th ed. 2007):
The substantive portions of the ADEA, including the prohibitions against
retaliation and discriminatory advertising are . .. virtually identical to the
antidiscrimination provisions of Title VII. The major difference, of course, is
that the ADEA only prohibits discrimination on the basis of age and only as
to persons 40 years of age or older.
107. Congress found that older workers were at a disadvantage with regard to their ability
"to retain employment, and especially to regain employment when displaced from jobs." ADEA §
621(a)(1). Congress noted that age limits-as well as other employment practices-may
contribute to this disadvantage. Id. § 621(a)(2). It explained:
[T]he incidence of unemployment, especially long-term unemployment with
resultant deterioration of skill, morale, and employer acceptability is, relative
to the younger ages, high among older workers; their numbers are great and
growing; and their employment problems grave.
Id. § 621(a)(3).
108. Unlike that against women or racial minorities, the discrimination against older
workers is most likely not as animus-based. ESTREICHER & HARPER, supra note 101, at 425 ("The
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3. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans with
Disabilities Act
The Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act
are likewise retrospective. Passed six years after the ADEA, the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits discrimination on the basis of
disability in federal programs and in federal employment, including
federal contract work.109 The statute includes a number of
congressional findings, justifying its protection based on
discrimination faced by people with disabilities.110
Almost two decades later, President George H. W. Bush signed
the ADA into law. The statute, divided into five titles, addresses
disability discrimination in employment, government services, public
and commercial accommodations, and telecommunications."'
Specifically, Title I forbids employers from discriminating against a
qualified individual on the basis of a disability in hiring, promotion,
training, and other job-related decisions.112 Title I of the ADA seeks to
provide disabled people with equal employment opportunities and
economic independence.
Congress made several findings detailing the discrimination
and exclusion endured by people with disabilities.113 As with race in
Title VII, the justification for outlawing discrimination stems from two
sources: society's exclusion of an entire class of qualified people from
role of employee and customer prejudice in reinforcing the use of age stereotypes by employers is
probably less significant than for race and sex stereotyping.").
109. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (2006).
110. Congress found that "millions of Americans have one or more physical or mental
disabilities and the number of Americans with such disabilities is increasing" and that
"individuals with disabilities constitute one of the most disadvantaged groups in society." Id. §
701(a)(1)-(2). Additionally, it noted that "individuals with disabilities continually encounter
various forms of discrimination in such critical areas as employment, housing, public
accommodations, education, transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization,
health services, voting, and public services . . . ." Id. § 701(a)(5). The Rehabilitation Act was,
therefore, looking to evidence of existing discrimination to justify antidiscrimination protection
for people with disabilities.
111. Title V of the ADA includes miscellaneous technical provisions.
112. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Title I, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006) ("No
covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the
disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or
discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment.").
113. For instance, Congress noted that "historically, society has tended to isolate and
segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social
problem." Id. § 12101(a)(2). Congress further explained that census and poll data indicated that
"people with disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status in our society, and are severely
disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally." Id. § 12101(a)(6).
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employment based on unfair stereotypes, and Congress's desire to put
an end to that cycle of discrimination. 114 The amendments to the ADA
echoed this sentiment in their findings, stating that "in enacting the
ADA, Congress recognized that ... people with physical or mental
disabilities are frequently precluded from [fully participating in all
aspects of society] because of prejudice, antiquated attitudes, or the
failure to remove societal and institutional barriers.""l5 Thus, the
disadvantage experienced by people with disabilities has been a
crucial element of Congress's decision to protect them against
discrimination, even as recently as 2008.
Judging from Title VII, the ADEA, the Rehabilitation Act, and
the ADA, antidiscrimination traditionally tends to be retrospective-
looking back at the historical treatment of disadvantaged groups to
justify their protection. GINA, however, stands apart as perhaps the
first preemptive antidiscrimination statute.
B. Preemptive Antidiscrimination Legislation
Unlike the preceding statutes-which respond to existing
inequities-little evidence indicates that genetic-information
discrimination is currently taking place on a large scale.
Genetic-information discrimination has arguably been
happening in some form or another for over a hundred years. Perhaps
the most notorious example of this phenomenon is eugenics, the use of
early genetic science to advocate eliminating particular socially
undesirable traits.116 GINA, however, envisions a different sort of
114. See Colin S. Diver & Jane Manslow-Cohen, Point/Counterpoint: Genophobia: What is
Wrong with Genetic Discrimination, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1478-79 (2001):
The moral justification for prohibiting disability discrimination is comparable
to that used to justify prohibitions on racial or gender discrimination. Our
society has, due to irrational prejudice and fear, excluded a class of persons
with certain readily identifiable conditions, fairly described as 'disabilities,'
from activities, such as employment, which they are otherwise qualified to
perform. Thus, an employer who excludes a person from an otherwise
suitable job solely because of her disability actively perpetuates that history
of oppression and subordination. In that sense, the employer implicates
herself sufficiently in the applicant's misfortune to become morally
responsible for its perpetuation.
115. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3557, § 2(a)(2).
116. Among the strategies used by eugenicists was forced sterilization. JACQUELINE VAUGHN
SWITZER, DISABLED RIGHTS: AMERICAN DISABILITY POLICY AND THE FIGHT FOR EQUALITY 37
(2003). The case, Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), is a notorious example. In upholding a
Virginia statute allowing for the involuntary sterilization of the "feeble-minded," the Supreme
Court reasoned that because "heredity plays an important part in the transmission of insanity,
imbecility, etc.," it is, therefore, preferable to "prevent those who are manifestly unfit from
continuing their kind." Id. at 205, 206, 207.
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coverage, primarily seeking to protect genetic information acquired
through modern genetic testing. 117 Moreover, GINA limits its
protection to health insurance and employment. 18 Thus, while
genetic-information discrimination may have occurred in some
capacity in the past, few cases have dealt with the variety of genetic-
information discrimination that GINA specifically targets.
GINA's detractors saw this lack of history as a fatal flaw in the
legislation. GINA's supporters, however, turned this criticism on its
head by urging Congress to do something it had never done-attempt
to stop discrimination before it takes hold. GINA, therefore, targets a
form of discrimination not yet happening extensively." 9
1. Evidence of a History of Genetic-Information Discrimination
Because antidiscrimination protection often draws from past
discriminatory treatment, GINA's proponents attempted to
demonstrate a longstanding history of genetic-information
discrimination.120 For example, in its findings, Congress connected
117. As mentioned, GINA does consider family histories to be genetic information, yet the
law focuses a great deal on the role of genetic testing. See, e.g., Perry W. Payne, Jr., Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008: The Federal Answer for Genetic Discrimination, 5 J.
HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 33, 60 (2009) (explaining that GINA "concerns a genetic testing market
that remains quite limited other than perhaps cancer screening and genetic testing for
newborns"); Michael S. Blackwell, Comment, Insurance, Employment, and the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 55 LoY. L. REV. 125, 139 (2009) (observing that "[t]he
definition of 'genetic information' is based primarily on the definition of 'genetic test' ").
118. There is, perhaps, a new eugenics on the rise; however GINA would do little to protect
against it. See, e.g., Kathleen Kingsbury, Which Kids Join Gangs? A Genetic Explanation, TIME,
June 10, 2009, available at http://www.time.com/time/healthlarticle/0,8599,1903703,00.html
(linking genetics to gang membership).
119. But see Statement of Paul Steven Miller, supra note 16 (citing the same survey for the
statement that "genetic service providers and primary care physicians reported knowing of 582
people who were refused employment or insurance based on their genetic predisposition"); Julian
Borger, Health Warning as DNA Screening Takes Hold, Americans Find it Can Leave Them
Unemployed and Uninsured: Who's Testing Our Genes-and Why?, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 19,
2000, at 15 (noting that a survey revealed over five hundred cases of genetic-information
discrimination in employment). Despite the numbers, however, that survey does not indicate
pervasive genetic-information discrimination, but merely that genetic-information
discrimination is happening at some level. See Statement of Paul Steven Miller, supra note 16
('The study's authors note that although this number is modest in relation to the total number of
patients seen by the surveyed professionals, genetic discrimination does in fact exist.").
120. See, e.g., SEC'Y'S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH, & Soc'Y, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS PUBLIC PERSPECTIVES ON GENETIC DISCRIMINATION: SEC'Y'S ADVISORY
COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH, & SoC'Y 21 (2004), available at http://oba.od.nih.
gov/obalsacghs/reports/PublicPerspectives_.GenDiscrim.pdf [hereinafter PUBLIC PERSPECTIVES]
(statement of Caroline Hinestrosa) ("As we clearly can see from the witnesses here today, genetic
discrimination is a real and growing problem that needs an immediate solution, not one that
should wait until we have further cases of women and men who have experience this type of
discrimination that is so detrimental to the ability to seek quality health care.").
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genetic-information discrimination with forced sterilization, 121 racially
targeted screenings for sickle cell anemia,122 and a 1998 Ninth Circuit
privacy case dealing with pre-employment genetic testing.123 Yet while
both legal and anecdotal evidence indicates that some genetic-
information discrimination was indeed occurring, it was on a rather
limited basis.
a. Legal Evidence of Genetic-Information Discrimination
Three federal cases addressed genetic-information
discrimination pre-GINA. As mentioned, Congress cited one of these
121. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat.
881, § 2(2) (2008):
The early science of genetics became the basis of State laws that provided for
the sterilization of persons having presumed genetic "defects" such as mental
retardation, mental disease, epilepsy, blindness, and hearing loss, among
other conditions. The first sterilization law was enacted in the State of
Indiana in 1907. By 1981, a majority of States adopted sterilization laws to
"correct" apparent genetic traits or tendencies. Many of these State laws have
since been repealed, and many have been modified to include essential
constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection. However,
the current explosion in the science of genetics, and the history of
sterilization laws by the States based on early genetic science, compels
Congressional action in this area.
122. See id. § 2(3):
Although genes are facially neutral markers, many genetic conditions and
disorders are associated with particular racial and ethnic groups and gender.
Because some genetic traits are most prevalent in particular groups,
members of a particular group may be stigmatized or discriminated against
as a result of that genetic information. This form of discrimination was
evident in the 1970s, which saw the advent of programs to screen and
identify carriers of sickle cell anemia, a disease which afflicts African-
Americans. Once again, State legislatures began to enact discriminatory laws
in the area, and in the early 1970s began mandating genetic screening of all
African Americans for sickle cell anemia, leading to discrimination and
unnecessary fear. To alleviate some of this stigma, Congress in 1972 passed
the National Sickle Cell Anemia Control Act, which withholds Federal
funding from States unless sickle cell testing is voluntary.
123. See id. § 2(4) ("Congress has been informed of examples of genetic discrimination in the
workplace. These include the use of pre-employment genetic screening at Lawrence Berkeley
Laboratory, which led to a court decision in favor of the employees in Norman-Bloodsaw v.
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, 135 F.3d 1260, 1269 (9th Cir. 1998). Congress clearly has a
compelling public interest in relieving the fear of discrimination and in prohibiting its actual
practice in employment and health insurance."). Similarly, Dean Karen Rothenberg linked
genetic-information discrimination to Eugenics, genetic inferiority, and the Holocaust. See
Protecting Workers From Genetic Discrimination: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health,
Employment, Labor, and Pensions of the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 110th Cong., 131-32
(2007) (statement of Karen Rothenberg, University of Maryland School of Law) [hereinafter
Statement of Karen Rothenberg] (stating that "eugenics was the scientific justification for killing
millions during the holocaust").
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cases, Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, in GINA's
findings. 124 According to the plaintiffs, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory
had a practice of testing its prospective employees' blood and urine-
without their knowledge or consent-for a series of "intimate medical
conditions," including sickle cell, syphilis, and pregnancy. 125 As a
result, employees sued the laboratory, its director, a group of medical
doctors employed by the lab, and members of California state
government for violating Title VII, the ADA, and their state and
federal rights to privacy.126 Regarding Title VII, the plaintiffs alleged
that the lab and the Regents of the University of California violated
the law by targeting black employees with sickle cell testing and
women with pregnancy screening.127 With respect to the ADA, the
plaintiffs argued that the defendants inappropriately engaged in
unnecessary medical testing.128
The district court dismissed all of the claims as time-barred,
finding that the statute of limitations began running at the time the
plaintiffs unwittingly took the test.129 When the plaintiffs appealed to
the Ninth Circuit, that court held that the ADA claims failed on the
merits and therefore affirmed with respect to those claims. 130
However, it reversed and remanded on the Title VII and constitutional
issues.131 The following year, the parties settled for $2.2 million.132 The
Ninth Circuit's holding suggests that Title VII might provide some
protection against employers' testing for genetic traits when those
traits implicate protected groups.
Another oft-cited example of genetic-information
discrimination involved Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corporation.
After employees began complaining that they developed carpal tunnel
syndrome from their jobs, Burlington Northern tested them for a
genetic predisposition to the disorder without their knowledge.133 The
EEOC sued Burlington Northern under the ADA.134 Although the
124. Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 1998); see supra
note 123 and accompanying text.
125. Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1264.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1265-66.
128. Id. at 1265.
129. Id. at 1266.
130. Id. at 1275.
131. Id.
132. Lisa Girion, Nurse Derails Genetic Testing: Wife of Railroad Worker Sparks Probe That
May Have Wide Implications, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2001, at W1.
133. Id.
134. T. Shawn Taylor, Railroad Settles Genetic-Test Suit: U.S. Contended Exams Violated
Disabilities Act, CHI. TRIB., May 9, 2002, at N3.
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company maintained it did not violate the ADA, Burlington Northern
settled with the EEOC (coincidentally) for $2.2 million. 135
A final example involves Terri Sergeant, a manager at an
insurance company, who lost her job after being diagnosed with alpha-
1 antitrypsin deficiency, a genetic condition that manifests as a
progressive lung disorder. 136 Being newly unemployed and with a
preexisting medical condition, Sergeant soon lost her disability,
health, and life insurance. 137 She then filed an ADA claim with the
EEOC, which after investigation supported Sergeant's allegation and
issued her a permission-to-sue letter. 138
These three cases constitute what may be the entirety of
documented federal genetic-information discrimination claims prior to
GINA.139 Yet, even if the above cases demonstrate a history of genetic-
information discrimination, they arguably imply that separate genetic
antidiscrimination legislation is unnecessary, as claimants potentially
could have obtained relief under Title VII or the ADA.140
b. Anecdotal Evidence of Genetic-Information Discrimination
In addition to the three cases above, GINA's proponents also
cited several anecdotal examples of genetic-information
discrimination. In 2004, the Secretary's Advisory Commission on
Genetics, Health, and Society ("SACGHS") held a forum on public
perspectives on genetic-information discrimination. Several people
shared their stories when they testified before SACGHS. Heidi
Williams spoke about how an insurer initially denied her children
health insurance because they were carriers of the gene for alpha-1
135. Id.
136. Discrimination in Workplace Now Includes Genetics, BUFFALO NEWS, July 30, 2001, at
Bi.
137. JONES & SARATA, supra note 5, at 20.
138. Id.
139. There is arguably a fourth genetic information case. In EEOC v. Woodbridge Corp., 263
F.3d 812, 813 (8th Cir. 2001), the EEOC sued on behalf of nineteen job applicants who had
received offers but were ultimately denied employment based on the results of a neurometric test
that screened for a proclivity to develop carpal tunnel syndrome. Although the test did not
analyze the genetic material of the applicants, it screened them for a predisposition-which could
have been genetic-to develop a particular medical condition. The district court granted
summary judgment and the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that Woodbridge did not regard the
prospective employees as generally disabled, just precluded from performing one particular,
specialized job. Id. at 816.
140. In reference to the Burlington Northern case, Burton J. Fishman stated that the case
"demonstrates that current laws were able to resolve the matter completely." Statement of
Burton J. Fishman, supra note 45.
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antitrypsin deficiency. 141 Phaedra Malatek discussed her family
history of hemochromatosis and how she did not seek genetic testing
for her two young sons for fear of discrimination by insurers. 142
Rebecca Fisher told the Committee about hiding her BRCA1 (a gene
associated with breast cancer) mutation from healthcare providers.143
Tonia Phillips explained that when she tested positive for BRCA1 and
underwent a preventive hysterectomy and a preventive mastectomy,
her boss confronted her about insurance costs and offered to pay her to
switch to her husband's plan.144 Paula Funk recanted how-because of
her strong family history of breast cancer-she paid for her own
genetic test and, after testing BRCA1 positive, was still waiting for
approval from her insurance company for her preventive
mastectomy.145 Caroline Hinestrosa, a breast cancer survivor and
executive vice president of National Breast Cancer Coalition,
explained to SACGHS that she did not undergo genetic testing out of
concern that the results could negatively impact her daughter. 146
Lastly, Phil Hardt, diagnosed with both hemophilia B and
Huntington's Disease ("HD"), relayed how he hid his hemophilia from
his boss, was denied credit insurance and long term care insurance
because of his HD, had a daughter who was told that she had to test
negatively for HD to get life insurance, and regretted that his
grandson could not obtain health insurance because of his inherited
hemophilia.147 He also told the Committee that his two children paid
out of pocket for HD tests and that he had helped set up anonymous
testing for HD.148
In addition to the testimony, SACGHS received written
statements, e-mails, and letters documenting stories of genetic-
information discrimination. However, the voluminous number of
responses is somewhat misleading. Not all the examples sent to the
SACGHS were the sort of discrimination envisioned by GINA. For
example, in one email, a mother whose son has ectodermaldysplasia, a
disease that may manifest as missing or irregular teeth, wrote about
how their dental insurance would not cover his dentures.149 She also
141. PUBLIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note 120, at 2-4 (statement of Heidi Williams).
142. Id. at 5-8 (statement of Phaedra Malatek).
143. Id. at 9-13 (statement of Rebecca Fisher).
144. Id. at 14-15 (statement of Tonia Phillips).
145. Id. at 16-19 (statement of Paula Funk).
146. Id. at 20-22 (statement of Carolina Hinestrosa).
147. Id. at 23-25 (statement of Phil Hardt).
148. Id.
149. E-mail from Pam Kennedy to Amanda K. Sarata (Aug. 20, 2004), in PUBLIC
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 120, at 47.
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mentioned that because people with ectodermaldysplasia may not
have sweat glands, they require air conditioning in school or at
work.o50 Her story is sympathetic to be sure, but her situation is an
example of discrimination on the basis of genetically based disability
rather than discrimination on the basis of genetic information.'5'
Thus, while it might appear at first blush that genetic-information
discrimination occurs with some frequency, many of the stories
collected by SACGHS are not the type of conduct GINA covers.
2. Evidence Against a History of Genetic-Information Discrimination
While many of GINA's proponents maintained that genetic-
information discrimination has posed a historical threat, other sources
indicated that these cases may be isolated incidents. For example, a
GINA-related congressional report stated that "[1]egal cases of genetic
discrimination have been few."152 Despite numerous state law
provisions,153 at the time of GINA's passing, no one had brought a
genetic-information employment discrimination case under those
statutes before any federal or state court, and the EEOC had settled
only one lawsuit-the Burlington Northern case-related to genetic-
information discrimination.15 4 In fact, some have argued that the very
notoriety of that case indicates it is more the exception than the rule
for employers.155 Others have claimed that evidence of genetic-
150. Id.
151. Similarly, while the Council for Responsible Genetics maintains it documented "as
many as five hundred cases" of genetic-information discrimination,
CouncilforResponsibleGentics.org, Genetic Testing, Privacy, and Discrimination, http://www.
councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/Projects/PastProject.aspx?projectId=1 (last visited Jan. 24,
2010), its position paper on genetic discrimination features examples not considered genetic-
information discrimination under GINA, including a diagnosis of Fragile X syndrome (an
inherited developmental impairment) and a woman's failure to be tested for BRCA- 1 out of fear
that a positive result could affect her at work. Council for Responsible Genetics, Genetic
Discrimination, available at http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/pageDocuments
/2RSW5M2HJ2.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2010).
152. NANCY LEE JONES & ALLISON M. SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. REPORT FOR CONG.,
No. RL30006, GENETIC INFORMATION: LEGAL ISSUES RELATING TO DISCRIMINATION AND PRIVACY
3 (updated Mar. 11, 2005); see also Gaia Bernstein, The Paradoxes of Technological Diffusion:
Genetic Discrimination and Internet Privacy, 39 CONN. L. REV. 241, 245 (2006) (noting that
"[g]enetic discrimination is rare and apparently on the decline").
153. See supra note 28 (discussing history of state-enacted protections against genetic-
information discrimination).
154. National Human Genome Research Institute, The Role of NHGRI in the Legislative
Process, http://www.genome.gov/12513976 (last reviewed May 11, 2009) (discussing an EEOC
suit against Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad).
155. See Statement of Burton J. Fishman, supra note 45 (discussing opposition to proposed
federal genetic antidiscrimination provisions); see also Bernstein, supra note 152, at 258-59
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information discrimination in insurance is equally scant.15 6 Even
within the scientific community, "[flew claims of [genetic-information]
discrimination have in fact been systematically investigated, verified,
or documented."15 7
Not surprisingly, opponents used the lack of historical
discrimination to argue GINA was unnecessary, disparaging the law
as "a remedy in search of a problem." 58 In particular, they noted that
the lack of a history set GINA apart from the antidiscrimination
statutes preceding it:
[I]n the more than thirty states which have laws prohibiting genetic discrimination,
there have been no reported cases, even though several statutes were enacted decades
ago. Thus, there is no empirical evidence of genetic discrimination in employment,
unlike the mountains of evidence of discriminatory conduct which preceded the passage
(noting that empirical evidence of genetic-information discrimination by employers indicates it is
rare and on the decline).
156. See Louis P. Garrison et al., A Review of Public Policy Issues in Promoting the
Development and Commercialization of Pharmacogenomic Applications: Challenges and
Implications, 40 DRUG METABOLISM REVS. 377, 395 (2008) (stating that at the time of GINA's
passing there had been "virtually no evidence of genetic information discrimination in the
insurance market"); see also Bernstein, supra note 152, at 259-60 (discussing survey research
finding that insurers rarely discriminate on the basis of genetic information and that 'little or no
genetic discrimination by health insurers is taking place").
157. Diver & Manslow-Cohen, supra note 114, at 1463.
158. Statement of Burton J. Fishman, supra note 45; see also Maria Ghazal, Health Policy
Director, American Benefits Council, quoted in Mark A. Hofmann, Genetic Bias Legislation Not
Needed, Some Say, Bus. INS. 4 (Oct. 20, 2003) (referring to the 2003 version of GINA as "a
solution in search of a problem"). The lack of existing genetic discrimination is, therefore, a
common criticism. ERIN. D. WILLIAMS, AMANDA K. SARATA & C. STEPHEN REDHEAD,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT, No. RL33903, GENETIC DISCRIMINATION:
OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUE AND PROPOSED LEGISLATION (updated Mar. 7, 2007) ("Some employers
question whether legislation is necessary because there are few documented cases of
discrimination based on genetic information, and there is no evidence that employers would use
the information if they had it. In addition, employers argue that existing law provides adequate
protection against genetic discrimination in employment."). One counterargument offered by
GINA's supporters was that genetic-information discrimination was indeed taking place, but for
one reason or another just could not be proven. Statement of Karen Rothenberg, supra note 123
(arguing that in addition to insurers' and employers' current failure to use genetic information,
two possible reasons for the lack of evidence of discrimination are (1) that victims of
discrimination simply do not know on what basis insurers and employers are making their
decisions and (2) that cases may be settled or otherwise go unreported); see also Karen
Rothenberg & Sharon Terry, Before It's Too Late: Addressing Fear of Genetic Information, 297
SCI. 196, July 12, 2002, at 196-97 (arguing the same). I do not spend much time on this line of
reasoning because it does not effectively advocate the passing of a separate and distinct genetic
antidiscrimination statute. If the reason for so few lawsuits is (1), GINA will make no difference
because claimants cannot combat discrimination if they do not know they are victims in the first
place. If an individual does not know she has suffered genetic-information discrimination, she
certainly will not be able prove it in court. With regard to (2), settling cases pre-GINA implies
that genetic discrimination victims have potentially viable claims under preexisting laws.
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of other nondiscrimination laws, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. 1 59
Thus, opponents viewed the absence of documented
discrimination as a major strike against GINA. In fact, some even
maintained that science has not yet evolved to a point at which we
know enough about genetic information to use it to discriminate.1 6 0
GINA's opponents, however, were not alone in discussing the lack of
genetic-information discrimination.
GINA's supporters used the absence of significant genetic-
information discrimination as a selling point. For example,
Representative Louise Slaughter pointed out the absurdity of waiting
for more discrimination to occur before outlawing it.161 Senator
Olympia Snowe asserted that GINA's supporters were "all taking a
stand that, as we look to the future, genetic discrimination will not be
allowed to flourish, to take root."162 Senator James Jeffords similarly
championed the preemptive law, urging Congress to "take that rare
opportunity to be ahead of the curve and enact legislation to preempt
discriminatory practices and prevent them from ever happening."163
Whereas GINA's opponents viewed the lack of genetic-information
discrimination as a weakness, its advocates saw it as an exciting
opportunity to preempt a new form of discrimination.
Thus, members on both sides of the GINA debate agreed that
genetic-information discrimination was not yet occurring widely.
159. Statement of Burton J. Fishman, supra note 45. On a similar note, according to the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce's Director of Labor Policy, Michael Eastman, "[o]ther anti-discrimination
laws, such as those of race or disabilities, were enacted after years of abuse-and that hasn't
happened with genetic testing." Marni Pyke, Can 'Positive' be a Negative on Your Job and
Insurance?, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Oct. 20, 2005, at 1.
160. Some scholars have argued that genetic-information discrimination is not occurring
significantly at present because it cannot. We currently lack the scientific know-how to be able to
discriminate on the basis of genetic information because we do not yet understand enough about
the relationship between genetics and disease. Diver & Manslow-Cohen, supra note 114, at
1476-77 ("There is no corresponding history of discrimination against the 'genetically
disadvantaged.' Indeed, there cannot be. The science that could permit the construction of such a
class is still in its infancy."); cf. Paul Steven Miller, Is There a Pink Slip in My Genes? Genetic
Discrimination in the Workplace, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 225, 234 (2000) (arguing for the
protection of genetic information but noting the "limited data gauging the extent of actual
discrimination due to the fairly recent development of genetic screening and the inherent
problem that exists in documenting such discrimination").
161. Letter from Rep. Louise Slaughter to the Members of the Sec'y Comm. on Genetics,
Health, & Soc'y (Sept 3, 2004), in PUBLIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note 120, at 56 (2004) ("Congress
should not wait to act until hundreds or thousands of people have experienced genetic
discrimination.").
162. Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Senate Backs Privacy for Genetic Data, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 25,
2008, at Al (quoting Sen. Olympia Snowe).
163. Press Release, Office of Sen. James M. Jeffords, Senate Passes Sen. Jeffords' Genetic
Non-Discrimination Bill (Feb. 17, 2005).
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Unlike the traditional retrospective antidiscrimination statutes, GINA
targets the potential for genetic-information discrimination. GINA is
therefore preemptive, seeking to stop a form of discrimination that
may pose a problem in the future. The following Part explores why
Congress decided to shift from a retrospective basis for
antidiscrimination protection to a preemptive one.
III. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PREEMPTIVELY ENACTING GINA
Traditional antidiscrimination statutes looked to past
discrimination to justify protecting against present and future
discrimination. Because genetic-information discrimination was not
yet happening to a significant degree, GINA's proponents used two
distinct but related arguments to support preempting genetic-
information discrimination: (1) a research justification and (2) an
antidiscrimination justification.
A. Research Justification
According to the research justification, people were afraid of
using genetic technology because they believed that insurance
companies and employers might use that information to discriminate
against them and their families. Well-documented public fear existed
around genetic testing. Research presented to Congress indicated that
93 percent of Americans believed that health insurers and employers
should not be able to use genetic information in making decisions. 164
Likewise, almost the same percentage feared that the negative results
of a genetic test could harm them, and nearly half of Americans
reported this as a serious concern.165 Anecdotal evidence from medical
professionals supported the position that the fear of discrimination
tempered the population's interest in genetic testing.166 Moreover, this
164. Protecting Workers From Genetic Discrimination: Hearing Before H. Comm. on Energy
& Commerce Subcomm. on Health, 110th Cong. 110-15 (2007) (testimony by Kathy Hudson,
Founder & Director of the Genetics and Public Policy Center) [hereinafter Testimony of Kathy
Hudson]; see also Daniel Schlein, New Frontiers for Genetic Privacy Law: The Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 19 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 311, 315 (2009)
(noting surveys showing that the public remains "wary" of genetic data misuse).
165. Testimony of Kathy Hudson, supra note 164 (indicating that more than 90 percent of
Americans are concerned that the results of their genetic tests could be misused and that as a
result they would either forgo genetic testing or go out of their way to keep results confidential).
166. Bernstein, supra note 152, at 261 (noting that "research has shown that fear of genetic
discrimination by insurers and employers is the primary barrier against testing"); Email from
John Quillin, Genetic Counselor, to Amanda K. Sarata (Sept. 9, 2004), in PUBLIC PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 120, at 93.
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fear was intergenerational. Genetic testing not only affects the person
being tested, but that person's whole family.167 Thus, people feared
that, if they tested positive for a genetic marker linked to any number
of diseases, their decision to undergo genetic testing could negatively
impact their loved ones.168 Representative Louise Slaughter, therefore,
described the decision to undergo genetic testing as "a Hobson's choice
between learning vital health information and risking [one's] health
insurance." 69 Thus, one explanation for the current absence of
discrimination is simply that genetic information is not readily
available to possible discriminators because most people are too afraid
to take genetic tests.
Proponents of protecting genetic information argued that the
fear of genetic testing was negatively impacting genetic research.
Scientific advancement requires clinical studies. However, the fear of
genetic-information discrimination was preventing many potential
research subjects from participating in studies, thereby slowing the
rate at which genetic technology could progress.170 As a result, the
biotech industry hoped that GINA might relieve anxieties around
genetic testing, so that new genetic testing products might flourish.171
Advocates, therefore, argued that public fear created a serious
impediment to genetic science because people were too frightened to
undergo testing.172
167. Park, supra note 6 (quoting Dr. Kent McKelvey) (explaining that genetic testing
"automatically affects your family members and that is fundamentally different from traditional
medical tests").
168. See, e.g., Sen. Olympia J. Snowe, Genetic Non-Discrimination-Time to Act to Protect
Our Privacy, U.S. FED. NEWS, July 16, 2004 (discussing a letter from a constituent explaining the
constituent's decision to forgo genetic testing based on her fear that the results might negatively
affect her daughter); Testimony of Carolina Hinestrosa (Oct. 18-19, 2004), in PUBLIC
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 120, at 10 (discussing personal experience as a breast cancer survivor
who avoided genetic testing for fear of its impact on her daughter).
169. 144 CONG. REC. H3,262 (daily ed. May 14, 1998) (statement of Rep. Slaughter).
170. Statement of Karen Rothenberg, supra note 123 (explaining that "[tihe tremendous
promise of genetics is hamstrung by fear"); see also 79 Fed. Reg. 9056, 9057 (Mar. 2, 2009) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1635); Genetics and Public Policy Center, U.S. Public Opinion on Uses of
Genetic Information and Genetic Discrimination (Apr. 24 2007), http://www.
dnapolicy.org/resources/GINAPublicOpinion_Genetic_InformationDiscrimination.pdf
(discussing negative impact of public fear of genetic testing on advances in genetic research).
171. See generally Maloyre Allison, Industry Welcomes Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act, 26 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 596, 596-97 (2008) (discussing positive
reaction of genetic testing industry to passage of GINA).
172. See, e.g., Senate Passes Bill Barring Genetic Discrimination, Iss. Sci. & TECH. 21, 21
(2004) (quoting Sen. Bill Frist as saying, "The fear of genetic discrimination has the potential to
prevent individuals from participating in research studies, from taking advantage of new genetic
technologies, or even from discovering that they are not at high risk for genetically related
illnesses'); Rep. Zach Wamp, A Looking Into Your Future Health?, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2004, at
A15 (arguing that federal genetic nondiscrimination legislation was key to insuring that
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In addition to stalling genetic science, supporters of genetic
antidiscrimination legislation also maintained that the fear of genetic
tests was harming the general public-people were not seeking
diagnoses and treatments that could improve or sustain their
health.173 For example, one-third of the women offered a genetic test
related to breast cancer declined, citing potential discrimination as the
reason. 174 This study indicates that people were foregoing genetic tests
that could lead to the prevention or early detection of serious health
conditions because of fear, thereby possibly compromising the level of
treatment and care available to them.
Not surprisingly, Congress explained in its findings that GINA
"is necessary to fully protect the public from discrimination and allay
their concerns about the potential for discrimination, thereby allowing
individuals to take advantage of genetic testing, technologies,
research, and new therapies." 175 Similarly, speaking out in favor of
genetic antidiscrimination legislation, Senator Judd Gregg explained
the dual goals of alleviating fear: "Fear of discrimination threatens
"Americans . . . reap the benefits of the genomic era"); Sen. Gregg Pushes for Protection of
Patients from Genetic Discrimination, U.S. FED. NEWS, July 22, 2004 (quoting Sen. Gregg as
saying that federal legislation was necessary to securing our "ability to use new genetic
technologies to improve human health and the scientific community's ability to conduct research
needed to understand, treat and prevent disease"). The National Human Genome Research
Institute, which lobbied for the legislation, identified the fear of genetic discrimination as one of
the major obstacles to realizing the benefits of the Human Genome Project and other advances in
genetic science. National Human Genome Research Institute, Genetic Discrimination,
http://www.genome.gov/10002077 (last updated Sept. 21, 2009).
173. See Payne, supra note 117, at 38. Anita Silvers and Michael Stein also discuss the
research justification in their 2002 piece in the VANDERBILT LAw REVIEW. See Anita Silvers &
Michael Ashley Stein, An Equality Paradigm for Preventing Genetic Discrimination, 55 VAND. L.
REV. 1341, 1351 (2002).
174. Standards for Privacy for Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg.
82,462, 82,466 (Dec. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 and 164) (quoting Sen. Patrick
Leahy).
175. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881
§ 2(5) (2008) (emphasis added). The EEOC reiterated Congress's purpose in its proposed rules,
released March 2, 2009. 79 Fed. Reg. 9056, 9057 (Mar. 2, 2009) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt.
1635):
Many genetic tests now exist that can inform individuals whether they may
be at risk for developing a specific disease or disorder. But just as the number
of genetic tests increase, so do the concerns of the general public about
whether they may be at risk of losing access to health coverage or
employment if insurers or employers have their genetic information.
Congress enacted GINA to address these concerns, by prohibiting
discrimination based on genetic information and restricting acquisition and
disclosure of such information, so that the general public would not fear
adverse employment- or health coverage-related consequences for having a
genetic test or participating in research studies that examine genetic
information.
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society's ability to use new genetic technologies to improve human
health and the scientific community's ability to conduct research
needed to understand, treat and prevent disease."176 Thus, the
purpose behind allaying the population's fear of discrimination on the
basis of genetic information was twofold: fear was both (1) impeding
the advancement of genetic technology because people were unwilling
to participate in clinical studies and other research and (2) stopping
people from taking advantage of medical services that might have the
ability to extend or save their lives. 77
Relieving the fear of genetic-information discrimination,
therefore, has both research-oriented and altruistic ends. 78
Interestingly, whether the concerns regarding genetic testing are
genuine or merely perceived is irrelevant: the goal of the legislation
was not to stop discrimination but rather to alleviate fear, and in so
doing, to advance genetic science and personal health.179
176. Sen. Gregg Pushes for Protection of Patients from Genetic Discrimination, supra note
172.
177. A representative of the National Human Genome Institute described how fear and its
impact on genetic science was GINA's true target:
The prevalence of genetic discrimination by insurance companies does not
appear to be the key issue. The real issue is that the public perceives that the
potential for discrimination by insurance companies is an overwhelming risk
and in my experience this fear provides a barrier to genetics research and
clinical genetics care. This barrier limits our potential for research in basic
sciences and social and behavioral research. The greatest tragedy, however,
is the missed opportunity to prevent cancer or diagnose it early in persons at
high risk who are unwilling to risk the potential of discrimination.
PUBLIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note 120, at 81 (testimony of Don Hadley, Associate Investigator
with the Social Behavioral Research Branch, Genetic Counselor with the Office of the Clinical
Director of the National Human Genome Research Institute); see also JONES & SARATA, supra
note 5, at Summary (noting problem of public fear as to misuse of genetic information and
potential for discrimination); Protecting Workers From Genetic Discrimination: Hearing Before H.
Comm. on Energy & Commerce Subcomm. on Health, 110th Cong. 110-15 (2007) (testimony of
Karen Pollitz, Research Professor, Georgetown University Health Policy Institute) (same); Letter
from Michael 0. Leavitt to Reed V. Tuckson (Nov. 8, 2005); PUBLIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note
120, at 20-21 (statement of Carolina Hinestrosa) (attesting to personal experience with fear as to
potential consequences of genetic testing); Senate Passes Bill Barring Genetic Discrimination,
supra note 172 (noting negative consequences of public fear of genetic information misuse and
discrimination based on such information).
178. See Miller, supra note 160, at 234 (noting that the "[riefusal to submit to genetic tests
due to fear of discrimination results in negative consequences both for the individuals who do not
get tested and for the advancement of scientific research in this area"); Rivka Jungreis, Fearing
Fear Itself: The Proposed Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2005 and Public Fears
About Genetic Information, 15 J.L. & POLY 211, 244 (2007) (observing that assuaging public fear
of genetic testing will benefit society "in two spheres-that of the advancement of scientific
research, and that of the individual's pursuit of optimal healthcare").
179. See MICHELE SCHOONMAKER & ERIN WILLIAMS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
REPORT, NO. RL32478, GENETIC TESTING: SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND AND NONDISCRIMINATION
LEGISLATION 2 (updated Feb. 14, 2005) ("Despite the fact that few cases of genetic discrimination
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B. Antidiscrimination Justification
Yet science was not the only justification for protecting genetic
information. GINA's proponents heralded the law as "the first civil
rights act of the 21st Century."180 Characterizing GINA as a "civil
rights act" implies that more was at stake than simply ameliorating
fears that could impede medical research.
Insurers and employers use personal information to make
decisions every day. Yet, for those decisions to constitute
"discrimination" in the pejorative sense, people must believe that
using that particular information is somehow inappropriate.
According to GINA's supporters, making decisions based on genetic
information is just such a scenario. When testifying before Congress,
Dr. Francis Collins, the director of the National Genome Research
Institute explained, "[W]hile genetic information and genetic
technology hold great promise for improving human health, they can
also be used in ways that are fundamentally unjust. Genetic
information can be used as the basis for insidious discrimination." 181
Yet what makes decisions based on genetic information
"fundamentally unjust"? 182
While this fact may change as genetic technology continues to
advance, 183 at present, genes are largely determined before birth and
can be documented, proponents believe that the new legislation is needed to allay the fears of
individuals about the potential for discriminatory practices so that they can seek beneficial
health services, participate in much-needed clinical research, and otherwise reap the benefits of
the publically funded Human Genome Project (HGP)."). When the goal is relieving fear, it does
not matter if that fear is real or imagined. See Bernstein, supra note 152, at 288 (noting that in
the context of AIDS testing "reducing the actual level of risk would not necessarily reduce the
perceived risk").
180. Sen. Gregg Pushes for Protection of Patients from Genetic Discrimination, supra note
172 (quoting Sen. Judd Gregg); see also Press Release, U.S. Senate, Kennedy, Enzi, Snowe
Celebrate Passage of Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (Apr. 24, 2008), available at
http://enzi.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=NewsRoom.NewsReleases
&ContentRecord id=86aa689b-802a-23ad-425c-6c6481cb42d2& Region.id=&Issueid= (quoting
Sen. Kennedy as calling GINA "the first major ... civil rights bill of the new century").
181. JONES & SARATA, supra note 5 (quoting Dr. Francis S. Collins, testimony given in 2000
before Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (citation omitted)); see also
Harmon, supra note 57 ("Democrats and Republicans alike cited anecdotes and polls illustrating
that people feel they should not be penalized because they happened to be born at higher risk for
a given disease.").
182. For more on the perceived unfairness of genetic-information discrimination, see Jeffrey
S. Morrow, Insuring Fairness: The Popular Creation of Genetic Antidiscrimination, 98 GEO. L.J.
215 (2009).
183. According to congressional testimony of Dr. Francis Collins, director of the National
Genome Research Institute in 2003, within ten years, genetic researchers at the time hoped to be
able to use gene therapy to treat a small number of conditions. See The National Institutes of
Health: Decoding Our Federal Investment in Genomic Research: Hearing before H. Comm. on
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subsequently remain outside of our control 84 (or at least extremely
difficult to alter 85). As a result, scholars and advocates have argued
that genetic information warrants protection because it is an
immutable characteristic.18 6
When invoked within antidiscrimination law, immutability
stands for the proposition that entities should not discriminate on the
basis of traits that a person did not chose and cannot change or control
without serious cost. 8 7  Not coincidentally, the perceived
Energy and Commerce Subcomm. on Health, 108th Cong. 108-23 (2003) (testimony of Francis
Collins). However, by 2020, Dr. Collins predicted that a number of what he called "gene-based
designer drugs" would be available to treat a number of conditions, including diabetes,
Alzheimer's, and hypertension. Id.
184. SCHOONMAKER & WILLIAMS, supra note 179, at 14 ("Individuals cannot help or change
their inherited genetic make-up (at least with today's scientific capabilities).").
185. Most gene therapy is somatic: it involves inserting therapeutic genes into the body cells
of a patient. For example, doctors could insert missing genes into a patient's extracted white
blood cells, cultivate more blood cells in a lab, and then re-administer the genetically altered
cells to treat genetic immunodeficiency disorders. While germ-line gene therapy-inserting
therapeutic genes into sperm or egg cells-is the subject of research, this practice is not being
applied to human beings, at least for the time being. Regardless, it appears that while we may be
able to change our genes before fertilization-or perhaps even in the very early stages of
gestation-once an organism begins to form, and certainly by the time it decides to apply for a
job or select health insurance, genetic material remains largely inalterable.
186. See, e.g., Alexandra K. Glazier, Genetic Predispositions, Prophylactic Treatments &
Private Health Insurance: Nothing is Better Than A Good Pair of Genes, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 45,
53 (1997) (arguing that "[a] defective gene is thus more akin to an immutable characteristic than
to an active disease"); Monique K. Mansoura & Frances S. Collins, 'Testing & Telling?":
Implications for Genetic Privacy, Family Disclosure & the Law, 1 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 329,
351 (1998) (arguing that a decision based on genetic information, which is "inherited and
immutable[,] is simply wrong"); Christine Formas Norris, The Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008: History, Successes, and Future Considerations, 7 U. MD. L.J.
RACE, RELIGION, & GENDER 192, 195 (2007) (asserting that "our genetic profiles are immutable
characteristics, because much like race and gender, our genes are inherited and unalterable");
see also Protecting Workers From Genetic Discrimination: Hearing Before H. Comm. on Educ. &
Labor Subcomm. on Health, Employment, Labor & Pensions, 110th Cong. 110-1 (2007)
(testimony by Harriet Pearson, Chief Privacy Officer, IBM Corp.) [hereinafter Testimony of
Harriet Pearson] (maintaining that "a person's genetic profile is as natural and as inseparable
from whom [sic] they are as any other physical trait or attribute.").
187. Erwin Chemerinsky notes the moral inclination that "it is unfair to discriminate against
people for a characteristic that is acquired at birth and cannot be changed." ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLE & POLICIES 551 (1997). Similarly, Robert Post
has observed that "[tihe unfairness of prejudice is particularly manifest when it is directed
against immutable traits, like race or sex." Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of
American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1, 8 (2000). More recently, Ed Stein mapped
the salience of "born that way" and "not a choice" arguments in favor of protecting sexual
orientation. Ed Stein, Born that Way? Not a Choice?: Problems with Biological and Psychological
Arguments for Gay Rights 9 (Cardozo Legal Studies Working Paper No. 223, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1104538. Courts have at times adopted the reasoning. See, e.g.,
DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 314 (1st Cir. 1997) ("If America stands for anything in the
world, it is fairness to all, without regard to race, sex, ethnicity, age, or other immutable
characteristics that a person does not choose and cannot change.").
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immutability8 8 of race, 89 sex,190 national origin, 191 disability,192 and
even age 93 has been cited as a reason for protecting those traits. (The
major exception to the immutability norm in antidiscrimination law is,
of course, religion. 194)
188. Importantly, I am not stating that any one of these categories is in fact immutable.
Disability, for example, can be completely temporary. I am merely noting that immutability has
at various times been used to justify protection.
189. When discussing Title VII in Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., the D.C. Circuit
stated that "Congress has said that no exercise of that responsibility may result in
discriminatory deprivation of equal opportunity because of immutable race, national origin, color,
or sex classification." 481 F.2d 1115, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (emphasis in original).
190. The Fifth Circuit held that "distinctions in employment practices between men and
women on the basis of something other than immutable or protected characteristics do not
inhibit employment opportunity in violation of [Title VII]." Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co.,
507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added).
191. In Garcia v. Gloor, the Fifth Circuit cited immutability as a justification for protection
of national origin, as well as other Title VII categories. 618 F.2d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 1980) ("Save
for religion, the discriminations on which the Act focuses its laser of prohibition are those that
are either beyond the victim's power to alter, or that impose a burden on an employee on one of
the prohibited bases. No one can change his place of birth (national origin), the place of birth of
his forebears (national origin), his race or fundamental sexual characteristics.").
192. When Congress initially passed GINA in 1990, it was explicit regarding the role of
immutability in protecting people with disabilities, stating in its findings in support of the ADA
that people with disabilities have suffered discrimination "based on characteristics that are
beyond the control of such individuals." Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, ch. 126, 42
U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (emphasis added), removed by the Americans with Disabilities Amendments
Act, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3557 (enacted 2008).
193. Despite age's ever-changing status, some courts have nonetheless held that it is an
immutable trait on par with race and sex. For example, in describing the passing of ADEA, the
Third Circuit explained that "[alge became a proscribed basis for employment decisions in much
the same manner as Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act had earlier prohibited employment
discrimination on the basis of other immutable personal characteristics such as race, color,
religion, sex or national origin." Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1236 (3d Cir. 1977)
(emphasis added). Judge Garth of the D.C. Circuit made a similar point in a 1988 dissenting
opinion. See Arnold v. U.S. Postal Serv., 863 F.2d 994, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Garth, J.,
dissenting). ("[U]nder Title VII, Congress has decreed that certain adverse employment decisions
made by employers based on an individual's possession of any of these characteristics, is
repugnant and illegal. In enacting the ADEA, Congress has also decreed that employment
decisions based on age, (an equally immutable characteristic), are similarly repugnant and
illegal."). Similarly, the First Circuit has grouped age with race, sex, and ethnicity as
characteristics worthy of protection because they are characteristics that "a person does not
choose and cannot change." DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 314 (1st Cir. 1997).
194. I do not discuss religion at length because courts do not link the protection of religion to
its immutability. However, scholars have noted that certain other requirements have periodically
functioned like immutability. See, e.g., Karen Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality: The Failure of
the Religious Accommodation Provision To Redeem Title VII, 76 TEX. L. REV. 317, 373 (1997)
(arguing that an institutional religion vs. personal preference dichotomy has sometimes
functioned like immutability); Jamie Darin Prenkert & Julie Manning Magid, A Hobson's Choice
Model for Religious Accommodation, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 467, 501 (2006) (noting that the sincerity
requirement in religion cases approximates the role of immutability).
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A number of GINA's proponents explicitly cited immutability to
justify protecting genetic information. 195 For example, Senator Snowe
explained that "[g]enetic discrimination is, by its nature, a purposeful
act based on an immutable fact-one's very heredity."196 Likewise, in a
hearing before Congress, one lawyer maintained that genetic
information warranted antidiscrimination protection because "we are
born with our 46 chromosomes and 30,000 genes. We cannot control or
change them."1 97 Representative Slaughter echoed this sentiment,
opining that "[n]o American[s] should have to worry that their genes-
which they did not choose, and over which they have no control-will
be used against them."1 98 Personal anecdotes reinforced this position.
One woman relayed her experiences with genetic-information
discrimination in a letter: "I learned that not only was I a carrier for
Hemophilia (which was not my fault or choice), but that I had a 50%
chance of inheriting Huntington's Disease as well (not my fault or
choice)."199
Despite recent arguments in favor of protecting genetic
information, many have questioned immutability's role in
antidiscrimination law. 20 0 In 1980, John Hart Ely attacked the idea
that courts should consider immutability when determining whether a
group warrants heightened equal protection scrutiny. He argued that
decisionmakers can cherry pick when immutability matters by linking
195. Jeffrey S. Morrow also notes the role of immutability in the perceived unfairness of
genetic-information discrimination. See Morrow, supra note 182, at 234-37. I, however,
disagree with his characterization of an immutability model as "disability model," id. at 236,
given that disability antidiscrimination protection is not grounded in blamelessness but rather in
a culture of exclusion. The ADA protects a paraplegic regardless of whether she acquired her
impairment as an innocent bystander or a drunk-driver. She need only demonstrate a
substantially limiting impairment. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (defining "disability" under the
ADA).
196. Press Release, Office of Sen. Olympia Snowe, Senate Passes Snowe Bill Banning
Genetic Discrimination by Insurers, Employers (Feb. 18, 2005), available at http://
snowe.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressRoom.PressReleases&ContentRecordid=df
2cbbd7-f4e9-4301-bef4-7231b2d5cdfb&Region id=&Issueid=.
197. Protecting Workers From Genetic Discrimination: Hearing Before H. Comm. on Energy
& Commerce Subcomm. on Health, 110th Cong. 110-15 (2007) (statement of Frank Swain).
198. 143 CONG. REC. E12 (1997) (statement of Rep. Louise Slaughter-Extension of
Remarks).
199. Letter from Michelle Thompson (Sept. 22, 2004), in PUBLIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note
120, at 65.
200. In fact, the role of immutability in antidiscrimination law has been so deeply criticized
that over a decade ago, Kenji Yoshino compared discussing immutability as "tantamount to
cataloguing new ways to flog a dying horse." Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal
Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell", 108 YALE L.J. 485,
491 (1998).
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the immutable trait to some sort of legitimizing purpose. 201 Similarly,
critics of GINA noted how the selective use of immutability led
Congress to protect genetic information but not other types of
immutable characteristics that increase one's proclivity for developing
a particular disease or disorder.202
However, the research justification for GINA went beyond
immutability. Although people do not choose and cannot change their
genes, Congress wanted to motivate those individuals who were
foregoing genetic testing out of fear to use available medical services
and participate in research. Offering antidiscrimination protections
for genetic information was essential to making people feel
comfortable with taking genetic tests.203 As a result, Congress could
encourage the use of genetic technology by protecting those immutable
traits. The two justifications for passing GINA-research and
antidiscrimination-are, therefore, inextricably related.
201. Ely asserted that:
[N]o one has bothered to build the logical bridge, to tell us exactly why we
should be suspicious of legislatures that classify on the basis of immutable
characteristics. Surely one has to feel sorry for a person disabled by
something that he or she can't do anything about, but I am not aware of any
reason to suppose that elected officials are unusually unlikely to share that
feeling. Moreover, classifications based on physical disability and intelligence
are typically accepted as legitimate, even by judges and commentators who
assert that immutability is relevant. The explanation, when one is given, is
that those characteristics (unlike the one the commentator is trying to render
suspect) are often relevant to legitimate purposes. At that point there's not
much left of the immutability theory, is there?
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 150 (1980); see also
Morrow, supra note 182, at 241-44 (discussing the malleable nature of immutability); Camille
Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and the Future of
Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134, 1141 (2004) (arguing "that the courts' focus on the
biological/voluntary distinction is fundamentally unprincipled and illogical, as the discriminatory
animus in cases involving so-called biological racial or ethnic traits and voluntary, performed
racial or ethnic traits operates identically").
202. Congress Restricts Use of Genetic Information by Insurers & Employers, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 1038, 1041 (2009) [hereinafter Congress Restricts Use] ("[GINA] implies and promotes
genetic exceptionalism-the idea that genetic information needs special treatment-despite
lacking a sound basis for separating genetic conditions from nongenetic ones that people did not
knowingly cause and cannot change."); see also Sonia M. Suter, The Allure and Peril of Genetic
Exceptionalism: Do We Need Special Genetics Legislation?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 669, 712 (2001)
("Although we cannot control the genes we inherit, we cannot control a great many other risk
factors, such as in utero exposures, environmental conditions, or drunk drivers, which may have
profound effects on our future health.").
203. See Testimony of Harriet Pearson, supra note 186:
By firmly establishing that none of us can be discriminated against on the
basis of the genes we are born with and have no real control over, we also will
create the safe foundation for future therapies that could repair or address
the genetic defect that might make us prone to particular diseases or
ailments.
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Having established the reasons behind enacting GINA
preemptively, the next Part of this Article proceeds to examine the
normative implications of preemptive antidiscrimination legislation.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF PREEMPTIVELY ENACTING GINA
Because GINA is perhaps the first preemptive
antidiscrimination statute in American legal history, the effect that an
absence of existing discrimination will have is unclear. There are
definite benefits to preempting discrimination-such as effectively
stopping discrimination before it starts-but also inherent difficulties.
A. Fear as a Basis for Law
One important theoretical question surrounding preemptive
legislation is whether the fear that something that does not pose a
significant current threat but may become one in the future should
ever form the basis of a law. GINA's adversaries maintained that fear
should not justify an antidiscrimination statute,204 criticizing the
anxieties over genetic-information discrimination as completely
unfounded. Not only was discrimination simply not happening, 205 they
argued, but nothing indicated that insurers and employers would ever
discriminate on the basis of genetic information if given the
opportunity.206 Opponents criticized the "anecdotal but apocryphal
stories," such as the more than decade-old Burlington Northern case,
as feeding the public's irrational fears. 207 Proponents countered with
evidence implying that the anxiety surrounding genetic testing has
204. In reference to fear as a primary justification for GINA, Fishman stated "That is not
how Congress has responded in the past and should not be how Congress responds today. Fear
should not be the predicate for federal legislation." Statement of Burton J. Fishman, supra note
45.
205. See supra Section II(B)(2) for the discussion of a lack of a history of genetic
discrimination.
206. Philip R. Reilly, Genetic Discrimination, in GENETIC TESTING AND THE USE OF
INFORMATION 106 (Clarisa Long ed., 1999) ("[L]ittle evidence supports the widespread fear that
people who undergo genetic tests to determine whether they are at increased risk for developing
a serious disorder face a significant risk of genetic discrimination."); see also Bernstein, supra
note 152, at 245 ("Genetic discrimination is rare and apparently on the decline. Potential
abusers, such as employers and insurers, do not use genetic information."); Diver & Manslow-
Cohen, supra note 114, at 1464 ("It is true, of course, that group-based discrimination can persist
in competitive labor markets, as the history of race-based and gender-based employment
discrimination vividly demonstrates. But that undeniable-and undeniably deplorable-fact does
not furnish a basis for predicting a similar pattern of irrational discrimination by genotype").
207. Statement of Burton J. Fishman, supra note 45.
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the possibility to become a practical reality.208 Yet, on some level, it
doesn't matter if the fear is founded or unfounded, so long as it has the
effect of altering behavior-such as encouraging genetic testing.209
One difficulty about legislating preemptively stems from the
inability to predict the future accurately. Philosopher Hans Jonas
proposed ethical guidelines to account for our limited-and inevitably
flawed-predictive scientific knowledge. 210 According to Jonas, we
cannot accurately know the future results of our present actions, the
conditions under which our descendants will live, or the norms future
generations will value. 211 Thus, it comes as no surprise that one
criticism of basing an antidiscrimination statute on fear was that
Congress is incapable of anticipating how the discrimination will
actually operate if it indeed occurs. 212 Moreover, preemptive
legislation could swiftly become obsolete or even detrimental. 213
However, the inability to predict future outcomes does not
imply that scientific advances always should go unchecked. Scientists
conducting research and creating technology may not be as aware-or
as wary-of the potential problems posed by their discoveries. Richard
Posner has noted that "[s]cientists want to advance scientific
208. Amy Harmon, Fear of Insurance Trouble Leads Many to Shun or Hide DNA Tests, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 24, 2008, at Al (citing a 2008 Georgetown University Health Policy Institute study
indicating that in seven of ninety-two hypothetical underwriting decisions, insurers would deny
coverage, charge more, or exclude some conditions based on genetic tests).
209. Letter from Reed V. Tuckson, Chair, Sec'y's Advisory Comm. on Genetics, Health, and
Soc'y, to Michael 0. Leavitt, Sec'y of Health and Human Servs. (May 3, 2005):
The Committee was influenced above all by the views and concerns we heard
from patients and the general public. Their testimony made it abundantly
clear that there are deep-seated fears about the potential for misuse of
genetic information in health insurance and employment and that the public
is concerned about the lack of specific Federal legal protections against
genetic discrimination. Moreover, the public testimony documented that in
many cases, healthcare decisions are being shaped by fear rather than best
medical practice.
See also Bernstein, supra note 152, at 288 (explaining that "need to influence the public
perception of risk is, therefore, particularly crucial in the case of preventive and non-triable
technologies, such as genetic testing').
210. HANS JONAS, THE IMPERATIVE OF RESPONSIBILITY: IN SEARCH OF AN ETHICS FOR THE
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 38-46 (1984).
211. Id.
212. Erin Heath, Zipping Up Genes Discrimination, NAT'L J., July 21, 2001 (quoting Prof.
Mark Hall, Wake Forest Univ.) ("It's difficult to craft legislation in advance of the problem
arising, because you don't fully know the dimensions of the problem.").
213. During a hearing on GINA, a lawyer noted that "[tioday's genetic nondiscrimination
legislation may quickly become outdated, and indeed counterproductive to its original purpose . .
Genetic Nondiscrimination: Implications for Employers and Employees: Hearing Before H.
Comm. on Energy & Commerce Subcomm. on Employer-Employee Relations, Comm. on Educ. &
the Workforce, 107th Cong. 75 (2001) (statement of Harold P. Coxson).
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knowledge rather than to protect society from science; the policy
maker's ordering of values is the reverse. Not that scientists are
indifferent to public safety; but it is not their business and sometimes
it is in competition with their business."214 In short, scientists want
what is best for science, not necessarily what is best for society.
Consequently, Posner encourages lawyers and lawmakers to think in
terms of prevention.2 15
Preventative legal protections, however, should not go forward
unfettered. Cass Sunstein has suggested implementing an "Anti-
Catastrophe Principle" to target the most serious risks by identifying
the worst-case scenarios and then taking regulatory action to reduce
those risks.216 Under this principle, an effective preemptive strategy
requires proposing cost-effective solutions, reducing the burdens on
those least equipped to handle them, and being aware of the
precaution's expense. 217 However, an individual who acts preemptively
must also realize that eliminating some risks can create others.218
Although the situations described by Posner and Sunstein are
life-threatening disasters,219 their message is clear: lawmakers should
sometimes intervene to alleviate fears associated with scientific
discoveries, especially when the risk of serious harm is high and the
cost of intervention is low. Thus, although we may lack perfect
knowledge regarding how scientific advancements will impact society,
there may be times when the law should alleviate fears associated
with developing technology.
GINA provided an excellent opportunity for preemptive
lawmaking. Like some of Posner's and Sunstein's catastrophic
examples, genetic-information discrimination results directly from
science. Discriminating on the basis of genetic information often relies
on testing and scientific expertise, 220 making genetic-information
214. RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 99 (2004).
215. See generally id.
216. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 109, 114-15
(2005).
217. Id. at 114-15.
218. Id.
219. POSNER, supra note 214, at 30 (quoting MARTIN REES, OUR FINAL HOUR: A SCIENTIST'S
WARNING: How TERROR, ERROR, AND ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTER THREATEN HUMANKIND'S
FUTURE IN THIS CENTURY-ON EARTH AND BEYOND 120-21 (2003)).
220. See Diver & Manslow-Cohen, supra note 114, at 1445 ("One obviously cannot base
discrimination on a person's genetic profile unless one has first obtained information about that
profile."); David F. Partlett, Misuse of Genetic Information: The Common Law and Professionals'
Liability, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 489, 489-91 (2003) ("Genetic information about individuals is
almost exclusively created by the application of professional scientific skill. . . . In these contexts
a professional has applied his expertise to the carrying out and interpretation of the genetic
test."). The exception is that family history constitutes genetic information, which requires only
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discrimination patently different from discrimination on the basis of
race, sex, age, or disability. 22 1 To face the kind of discrimination
covered by GINA, most individuals will have to opt-in to the category
of potential victims by taking genetic tests. Because science created
the category "genetic information," it in effect created the potential for
genetic-information discrimination. Thus, lawmakers arguably should
intervene to protect society from the potentially negative results of
these discoveries. However, preempting discrimination has both
benefits and problems.
B. Benefits
GINA has both economic and social benefits. From an economic
perspective, the benefits posed by prohibiting genetic-information
discrimination should outweigh the costs of enacting the law. First,
GINA responds to two serious risks: a risk of discrimination and a risk
that scientific research might stagnate due to the fear of genetic
testing. Second, GINA's expected costs are low. Congress estimated
that passing GINA would have "no significant effect on direct
spending."222 Additionally, insurers and employers do not yet have
widespread access to genetic information, so the law does not restrict
any deeply ingrained existing practices that would have to be changed.
Furthermore, genetic-information discrimination is not yet happening
on a significant scale, so no immediate litigation expenses should
result. In fact, if the statute effectively preempts genetic-information
discrimination, valid GINA claims may be exceedingly rare. Lastly,
with regard to genetic-information discrimination, the interests of
both science and society are aligned: GINA protects people from
possible discrimination and advances science by alleviating fear that
may have prevented clinical studies and further research. The fear of
genetic-information discrimination was, therefore, an appropriate
circumstance for enacting preemptive legislation.
From a social perspective, the greatest advantage of
preemptively enacting GINA is preventing genetic-information
the diagnosis of manifested condition in an individual's family member, not the results of a
genetic test. GINA, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 §§ 101(a)(2), 102(a)(2), 103(a)(2), 104(b),
201(4)(A)(i)-(iii) (2008) (defining "genetic information").
221. Norris, supra note 186, at 198 ("Unlike race, ethnicity, religion, or gender, genetic
predispositions are not readily apparent without laboratory genetic testing, physical medical
examinations, or the disclosure of family medical histories.").
222. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE, H.R. 493, GENETIC INFORMATION
NONDISCRIMINATION ACT OF 2007, at 1 (2007).
2010] 483
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [
discrimination from ever taking root. One possible reason for the
limited evidence of genetic-information discrimination is the absence
of a cognizable class of genetically disadvantaged people. As
mentioned in Part II, genetic science may not be yet at the point
where our understanding of the connection between genetics and
health is sufficient to create a genetic underclass. But even if we have
arrived at that point, genetic testing is not sufficiently widespread for
such a group to exist at present.
Regardless of whether the result of a lack of technology or of a
lack of testing, GINA is currently without a recognized category of
people targeted by its protections. Thus, GINA is perhaps the first
antidiscrimination statute passed without an associated identity
group. The absence of an existing socially recognized group means
that there are no preconceived notions regarding that group.
Importantly, without an established group, there can be no stigma
involving group membership. Thus, perhaps the greatest benefit of
preemptive genetic antidiscrimination legislation is that-if enacted
swiftly-it could preempt the formation of underlying social stigma.
Yet, while potentially successful in preempting discrimination, GINA
is not without its flaws.
C. Problems
GINA's preemptive nature generates two significant types of
problems: enforcement problems and effectiveness problems. Thus,
while GINA's preemptive quality might be the statute's biggest asset,
it is also the statute's most pronounced weakness.
1. Enforcement Problems
Perhaps the most daunting problem facing GINA is whether
Congress has the authority to pass preemptive antidiscrimination
legislation. Congress may only enact laws pursuant to its
constitutionally enumerated powers. 223 While it did not specify under
which power it passed GINA, Congress cited forced sterilization,
racially driven sickle cell testing, and the Norman-Bloodsaw case as
justifications for the legislation. 224 These examples imply that
Congress passed GINA as a civil rights law pursuant to either Section
223. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) ("Every law enacted by Congress
must be based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the Constitution."); Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) ("The powers of the legislature are defined, and
limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.").
224. See supra notes 121-123 and accompanying text.
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5 of the Fourteenth Amendment or its Article I commerce power. 226
Consequently, the law may face several foreseeable challenges,
particularly regarding its application to the states. 226
The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes."227 The Supreme Court has held that
Congress's commerce power covers "channels of interstate commerce";
"instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from
intrastate activities"; and "those activities having a substantial
relation to interstate commerce." 228 While laws passed under
Congress's commerce power may apply to both state and private
actors, the Court has held that laws falling solely under the Commerce
Clause cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity in suits for
damages. 229 Thus, absent a waiver of sovereign immunity, private
litigants cannot recover against state defendants when suing for
damages under a statute supported only by the commerce power.
Congress, however, may abrogate Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity when passing Section 5 legislation. 23 0 Section 5
provides that "Congress shall have power to enforce [the substantive
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment-including equal protection
and due process], by appropriate legislation."231 Although capable of
piercing the veil of sovereign immunity, Congress's Section 5 power is
not unlimited. Because the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to
state actions, laws passed under Section 5 cannot prohibit private
225. Civil rights legislation is often passed under these powers. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §
12101(b)(4) (2000) ("It is the purpose of this Act . . . to invoke the sweep of congressional
authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce,
in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with
disabilities.").
226. For a more detailed analysis of GINA's potential enforcement problems, see Harper
Jean Tobin, The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008: A Case Study of the Need
for Better Congressional Responses to Federalism Jurisprudence, 35 J. LEGIS. (forthcoming),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1375684.
227. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
228. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995)).
229. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73, 76 (1996). But see Cent. Va. Cmty.
Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 379 (2006) (holding that Congress may abrogate sovereign immunity
under the Bankruptcy Clause). While units of local governments qualify as state actors under
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Eleventh Amendment does not protect them. Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368-69 (2001). Thus, the Eleventh Amendment does not protect all state
actors. The Commerce Clause legislation, therefore, applies to those unprotected state actors.
230. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
231. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517 (1997).
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conduct.232 Additionally, laws enforced via Section 5 cannot redefine
the substance of the underlying constitutional protections they seek to
enforce.2 33 Thus, Section 5 protections must be "congruent" and
"proportional" to their Section 1 counterparts. 234
The congruence and proportionality test proceeds in two parts:
it begins with a determination of whether the legislation targets a
pattern of constitutional wrongs, then it looks to whether the remedy
is proportional to the statute's remedial intent.235 For example, in
University of Alabama v. Garrett, state employees filed for damages
under Title I of the ADA. The Supreme Court held that Title I of the
ADA did not abrogate sovereign immunity.236 The provision, however,
appears to have remained valid, ostensibly under the Commerce
Clause. The Court began its Section 5 analysis by examining the level
of protection allocated to people with disabilities under Section 1.237
After concluding that "rational basis" was the appropriate level of
scrutiny, the Court turned to the first part of the congruence and
proportionality test, examining "whether Congress identified a history
and pattern of unconstitutional employment discrimination by the
States against the disabled."238 Yet despite Congress's efforts to
establish a history of discrimination against people with disabilities,
the Court ultimately concluded that "[t]he legislative record of the
ADA ... simply fails to show that Congress did in fact identify a
pattern of irrational state discrimination in employment against the
disabled."239 The absence of a history of discrimination, therefore, may
invalidate Section 5 laws.
Although GINA's drafters attempted to create a comprehensive
law that applies to all varieties of health insurance and all facets of
employment, GINA's provisions may not withstand constitutional
scrutiny. Given that GINA deals with health insurance and
employment, the Court would likely uphold GINA under the
Commerce Clause, because both substantive titles relate in some
capacity to interstate commerce. Thus, the law would apply to actors
232. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621.
233. Flores, 521 U.S. at 519 ("Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing
what the right is.").
234. Id. at 520.
235. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 639
(1999) ("[F]or Congress to invoke § 5, it must identify conduct transgressing the Fourteenth
Amendment's substantive provisions, and must tailor its legislative scheme to remedying or
preventing such conduct.").
236. Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001).
237. Id. at 365-68.




not protected by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. While
Congress may pierce sovereign immunity under Section 5, GINA most
likely would not satisfy the Court's congruence and proportionality
test because of the limited evidence of existing genetic-information
discrimination. Like people with disabilities, the genetically
disadvantaged therefore would probably receive the lowest level of
equal protection review. 240 Thus, the level of Section 1 protection
enforced by GINA would most likely be at its constitutional nadir.
More importantly, because GINA is largely preemptive, there is little
evidence of a history and pattern of unconstitutional discrimination.
GINA, therefore, would likely fail the first prong of the congruence
and proportionality test, making it unenforceable against the states.241
In sum, regardless of how it is constitutionally authorized,
GINA faces substantial limitations because of its preemptive qualities.
If Congress passed GINA only pursuant to its commerce power, GINA
would reach private actors, as well as state actors not within the scope
of Eleventh Amendment protection. However, because Congress
cannot abrogate sovereign immunity in suits for damages under its
commerce power alone and because GINA would likely fail the
congruence and proportionality test for Section 5 legislation, Title II
may not apply to state employers in private suits for money
damages. 242 GINA's preemptive nature at best limits how the law
applies to certain state actors and at worse invalidates the law
completely.
2. Effectiveness Problems
In addition to creating problems with enforcement,
preemptively enacting legislation generates difficulties regarding the
law's effectiveness. Because the legislation seeks to bypass future
240. Jessica L. Roberts, An Area of Refuge: Due Process Analysis & Emergency Evacuation
for People with Disabilities, 13 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 127, 137 (2005) (noting that the Supreme
Court has not given a new group heightened scrutiny in over three decades).
241. Silvers & Stein, supra note 173, at 1376 ("There is, first, a question about how
efficaciously federal antidiscrimination regulations can constrain states from discriminating
against prospective and present employees on the basis of predictive genetic information. The
Supreme Court has struck down the application of certain provisions of both the ADA (in Board
of Trustees v. Garrett) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (in Kimel v. Florida Board
of Regents) to states in view of their Eleventh Amendment immunity. In both these cases, the
Court declared that Congress did not have sufficient evidence of pervasive historical
discrimination on the proscribed basis by the states, which is the sole condition under which a
civil rights approach can constrain state sovereignty. There is less historical evidence, not more,
that states have discriminated on the basis of predictive genetic information.").
242. Title I does not pose as much of a problem because health insurance laws, such as
ERISA, amended by GINA do not provide remedies for monetary damages.
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discrimination-not to end existing discrimination-its success will be
difficult to measure. If genetic-information discrimination erupts into
an epidemic and litigants cannot prevail in their lawsuits, then the
law quite clearly will have failed. On the contrary, if time passes and
genetic-information discrimination never occurs on a major scale, two
opposing scenarios will exist. Under one scenario, GINA's opponents
were correct and the legislation was unnecessary, either because
existing laws were doing the job or because health insurers and
employers were not interested in genetic information after all. Under
the other scenario, GINA was an immense victory and managed to
preempt genetic-information discrimination before it ever occurred.
Thus, because GINA attempts to preempt discrimination, we may
never know if the statute was hugely successful or completely
unnecessary.243
As discussed earlier, 244 Congress intended to alleviate the fear
of discrimination. However, simply passing legislation may not end
the anxieties surrounding genetic-information discrimination. 245 For
example, assuming that GINA's advocates are correct and people are
avoiding genetic testing out of fear of discrimination, the extensive
state protections pre-GINA indicate that people may need more than
legal protections to feel comfortable taking genetic tests. Furthermore,
the research justification relies on the assumption that people are
responding honestly to the survey questions when, in fact, their desire
to bypass genetic testing may include other motivating factors apart
from discrimination, such as the possible reaction of family
memberS246 or simply not wanting to know. Finally, additional survey
research indicates that people may not have confidence in GINA's
protections until it has been used in court. 247 Ironically, if GINA is
truly successful as a statute, employers and health insurers will not
discriminate, 248 leaving litigants limited opportunities to test the
243. Congress Restricts Use, supra note 202, at 1042-43 (explaining that preempting genetic-
information discrimination renders unknowable the potential severity of that discrimination had
it gone unchecked); see also Blackwell, supra note 117, at 168 (asserting that given the lack of
documented discrimination, GINA's protections maybe presently unnecessary).
244. See supra Part III.A.
245. See Blackwell, supra note 117, at 165 (noting that "[e]ven if GINA protects against
potential genetic discrimination, this does not necessarily mean that the number of individuals
who will participate in genetic testing will increase").
246. See Payne, supra note 117, at 39 (suggesting that "psychological concern or concern
about family members' responses" might also be motivating factors).
247. MARILYN E. CooRS, THE MATRIX: CHARTING AN ETHICS OF INHERITABLE GENETIC
MODIFICATION 20-21 (2002).
248. One can imagine employers and health insurers hiring experts to avoid GINA
violations. An over-enforcement problem might develop in which legal advisors admonish covered
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statute. As a result, GINA may not have the desired effect of
assuaging people's fears. Moreover, passing legislation may even
legitimate those fears by implying that genetic information poses a
greater threat than it actually does. 24 9 Preemptively enacting GINA
may interfere with the statute's effectiveness not only by obscuring
our ability to measure its success, but also by legitimizing the very
fears it sought to relieve.
To conclude, preemptively enacting GINA carries both positive
and negative implications. On the one hand, preemptive legislation
allows Congress to bypass future discrimination. On the other,
preemptive legislation gives rise to a unique set of problems that could
affect both the statute's enforcement and effectiveness.
CONCLUSION
Before GINA, four major statutes governed employment
discrimination. Although they were different in construction and
passed decades apart, Title VII, the ADEA, the Rehabilitation Act,
and Title I of the ADA shared a similar purpose: to end a particular
form of existing discrimination. The statutes were retrospective,
justifying antidiscrimination protection based on histories of
discrimination. Yet when GINA passed in 2008, little evidence
indicated that genetic-information discrimination posed a historical-
or even a current-threat. While GINA's opponents saw the absence of
a history of discrimination as a major flaw, its advocates embraced the
slim record as an exciting opportunity to preempt discrimination for
the first time in American history.
The law's proponents cited two related reasons for enacting
GINA preemptively: (1) alleviating public fear to advance scientific
research and (2) the belief that it is fundamentally unfair to
discriminate against individuals based on traits they did not choose
and cannot change. In passing GINA, Congress hoped to encourage
people to seek genetic testing without fear of discrimination.
GINA's preemptive nature truly makes the statute unique.
GINA provides a novel opportunity to stop a new form of
discrimination before it takes hold. Moreover, because a socially
recognized group of genetically disadvantaged people does not
currently exist, GINA can preempt not only discrimination but also
entities to avoid all genetic testing, even pursuant to GINA's exceptions, thereby further limiting
research participation.
249. Congress Restricts Use, supra note 202, at 1043; Bernstein, supra note 152, at 264
(noting that pre-GINA genetic antidiscrimination legislation actually increased fears because of
the publicity surrounding those laws).
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the formation of a new type of social stigma. However, preemptive
lawmaking also has inherent problems. Most notably, GINA likely
would not withstand analysis under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment because of the lack of a well-established pattern of
genetic-information discrimination. This potential failure calls into
question Congress's authority to pass preemptive legislation.
Additionally, because GINA is preemptive, it may be practically
impossible to measure its true effectiveness. Sadly, GINA may fail to
alleviate (or may even legitimize) fears of genetic-information
discrimination. We will have to wait and see whether the positives of
legislating preemptively outweigh the negatives. And even so, the fact
that Congress preemptively enacted GINA does not ensure that we
will see other preemptive legislation in the future.
Recent developments indicate that GINA is merely the
exception to the well-established practice of retrospective lawmaking.
In January 2009, President Obama signed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair
Pay Act.250 That new law overturned an unpopular Supreme Court
case by providing that the statute of limitations for equal pay actions
resets with every new paycheck. 251 It accomplishes this result by
amending Title VII, the ADEA, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.252 Despite its compensation provision, GINA is notably absent
from the list of amended laws. Perhaps the omission was a simple
oversight or a technicality because GINA was not yet in effect.
However, after thirteen long years in Congress, it seems hard to
believe that GINA would so quickly slip everyone's minds.
Alternatively, GINA's absence could mean that the new law is not on
equal footing with its predecessors. If so, perhaps the research
justification was Congress's singular aim. Only time will tell whether
Congress is now truly open to enacting preemptive legislation or
whether GINA was just a necessary legal anomaly intended to further
science.
250. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).
251. Id.
252. Id.
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